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Crowdsourcing is an intriguing option to carry out the last-mile delivery of goods. Due to 
the rising trend of ecommerce many companies face the pressure to offer home deliveries 
to their customers. However, companies still struggle to make these last-mile deliveries 
profitable due to the challenging optimization of distances between drop-off points and 
corresponding delivery times. Crowdsourcing tackles these obstacles by tapping into a 
large mass of individual deliverers and their unused resources, such as the leftover space 
in a customer’s car. Indeed, crowdsourcing is proven to enable faster, and more cost 
efficient deliveries. 
 
Crowds have been exploited in a wide array of businesses but only recently has the trend 
of crowdsourcing goods deliveries emerged. Consequently, there exists only limited 
empirical research on the subject. Further, thus far the crowdsourcing literature has been 
mainly based on various applications on crowdsourcing product development. Hence, it is 
not yet fully understood how crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms engage their 
deliverers and grow the platform. 
 
The aim of this study is to analyse strategies that crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms 
adopt to realize network effects and engage crowds. This qualitative multiple-case study 
explores nine crowdsourcing goods delivery companies that operate solely as 
intermediaries that connect people who need something delivered with those who are able 
and willing to do the task. The data analysis follows Eisenhardt's (1989) instructions on 
building theory from case study research, deriving tentative findings within the individual 
cases and then comparing these emergent patterns across the cases. A framework was 
synthesized from recent crowdsourcing and multi-sided platform literature to focus the 
analysis on issues closely related to crowdsourcing platforms. The framework observes 
openness, pricing and governance strategies used by the platform owners. 
 
This study reveals strategies that the crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms adopted to 
build up a viable platform. They combined strategies that are typical of both multi-sided 
platforms and crowdsourcing environments. Further, my findings suggest that these 
platform strategies were used sequentially to address different challenges in the different 
phases of the case companies’ life cycle. 
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Tavarakuljetusten joukkoistaminen on houkutteleva vaihtoehto kuljettaa verkkotilaukset 
asiakkaille. Verkkokaupan yleistyessä moni yritys on joutunut tarjoamaan 
kotiinkuljetuksia asiakkailleen. Kuljetusten toteuttaminen tehokkaasti on kuitenkin 
haasteellista tilauksien reitittämisen ja vastaavien aikaikkunoiden optimoinnin vaikeuden 
vuoksi. Joukkoistaminen vastaa näihin ongelmiin käyttäen hyväkseen suurta määrää 
kuljettajia ja heidän resurssejaan. Joukkoistamalla yritys voi esimerkiksi antaa 
verkkotilaukset kaupassa käyvien asiakkaiden kuljetettavaksi. Joukkoistamisen on todettu 
tekevän kuljetuksista nopeampia ja kustannustehokkaampia. 
 
Joukkoistamista on käytetty hyväksi monella alalla, mutta tavarakuljetusten 
joukkoistaminen on tullut vasta nyt mahdolliseksi. Aiheesta on tehty hyvin vähän 
empiiristä tutkimusta, ja joukkoistamista käsittelevä tutkimus perustuu pääosin avoimiin 
tuotekehityssovelluksiin. Aiempi tutkimus ei siis kerro, miten joukkoistetut 
tavarakuljetusalustat sitouttavat kuljettajia ja kasvattavat palveluaan tehokkaasti. 
 
Työn tavoitteena oli perehtyä strategioihin, joita joukkoistetut tavarakuljetusalustat 
käyttävät luodakseen kasvavan alustan ja sitouttaakseen käyttäjiään. Tämä kvalitatiivinen 
monitapaustutkimus tarkastelee yhdeksää yritystä, jotka joukkoistavat 
tavarakuljetuksensa yksityisille kuljettajille toimien ainoastaan tilauksien välittäjänä. 
Data-analyysi perustui Eisenhardtin (1989) tapaustutkimusmetodiin, jossa löydökset 
kerättiin aluksi yritystapauksista erikseen, jonka jälkeen niitä verrattiin keskenään eri 
tapausten kesken. Viitekehys piti analyysin rajattuna strategioihin, jotka liittyvät 
ainoastaan monipuolisiin markkinoihin ja joukkoistamiseen. Viitekehys koottiin 
vastaavasta kirjallisuudesta ja se keskittyy avonaisuus-, hinnoittelu- ja 
valvontastrategioihin. 
 
Tutkimus luettelee strategioita, joita joukkoistetut tavarakuljetusalustat käyttivät 
rakentaakseen toimivan alustan ja käyttäjäyhteisön. Yritykset yhdistelivät strategioita, 
jotka ovat tyypillisiä käytettäväksi sekä monipuolisilla markkinoilla että joukkoistetuilla 
alustoilla. Lisäksi löydösteni perusteella näitä strategioita käytettiin vastaamaan eri 
kasvuvaiheiden tuomiin haasteisiin.  
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1. Introduction 
Exploiting crowds in goods deliveries is an intriguing opportunity for any business facing 
a pressure to offer last-mile and on-demand deliveries. It is still a challenge to deliver the 
last-mile in a profitable way due to difficult optimization of distances between drop-off 
points (Boyer et al. 2009) and corresponding delivery times (Punakivi & Saranen 2001; 
Boyer et al. 2009). In crowdsourced deliveries, however, these obstacles are overcome by 
tapping into large masses (Brabham 2008) and their unused resources (Owyang 2014). A 
leftover space in an existing customer’s car, for instance, is an example of unused 
resource that is an advantage impossible to be imitated by traditional logistics. 
Crowdsourcing also provides new opportunities to improve over all efficiency by 
reducing fixed costs, such as employees and owned vehicles. Further, exploiting a large 
base of collaborators potentially speeds up production (Satzger et al. 2013; Kohler 2015).  
Although crowdsourcing is not a novel phenomenon, only recently has the possibility of 
crowdsourcing the goods deliveries become viable. The main drivers, the widespread 
mobile technologies (Rougès & Montreuil 2014; Owyang 2014), the social networks 
(ibid.), the Internet of Everything (Owyang 2014) and Web 2.0 (Kleemann & Voß 2008) 
have enabled platforms to reassign the challenging on-demand and last-mile deliveries for 
crowds to handle. These technologies have facilitated managing communication and 
interactions between people (Kleemann & Voß 2008), which has led to the emergence of 
novel applications in crowdsourcing. For example, only during the recent years has the 
transportation industry been famously disrupted by new players exploiting crowds, such 
as Uber and Lyft. 
As attractive as it may appear, turning a business model into a fully functional and viable 
crowdsourcing platform is a challenge. Firstly, any crowdsourcing platform should 
engage a crowd that is both willing and able to participate in value creation (Kohler 
2015). Secondly, as these platforms connect two or more entities whose participation is 
dependent on the other side, managing the platform becomes even more complicated. 
Value for one entity tends to increase with the size of the entity on the other side (Hagiu 
2014; Evans 2003; Kohler 2015). But an unbalanced platform, where one user group 
becomes too large, could result in excess competition on one side, which in turn lowers 
 2 
the value of the platform (Eisenmann et al. 2006). Moreover, as there are multiple entities 
of users, there are, naturally, multiple conflicting interests (Hagiu 2014). Thus, on a more 
granular level, managing a platform involves matching needs of various users in a 
sustainable manner. Finally, the crowdsourcing is still a new concept especially in the 
goods deliveries domain and people might be unwilling to let a random person to deliver 
groceries, for instance. Hence, crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms still need to win 
the trust of consumers by proving that they are capable of offering the same quality that 
traditional logistics companies offer.  
What are the strategies for exploiting the necessary network effects and to engage crowds 
on a crowdsourcing goods delivery platform, then? There is little we know about the 
strategies used in the crowdsourcing in the services domain and in the domain of goods 
deliveries, in particular. Prior literature on crowdsourcing has mainly discussed the 
phenomenon in the product development, where open source software projects (Boudreau 
& Hagiu 2008) and problem solving, innovation (Satzger et al. 2013), and product design 
competitions (Kohler 2015) have provided the base for empirical research. In addition, 
only limited empirical research (e.g., Rougès & Montreuil 2014; Sadilek et al. 2013) 
explores the crowdsourcing goods deliveries. In their study, Rougès & Montreuil (2014) 
contribute toward a better understanding of value creation in crowdsourcing goods 
delivery companies. Based on their sample group’s daily driving habits, Sadilek et al. 
(2013) prove that packages can be delivered with remarkable speed and coverage using a 
crowdsourcing based delivery model. Thus, prior literature does not provide insights into 
what makes the crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms viable.  
Further, crowdsourcing platforms operate in multi-sided markets, and yet it is unclear 
how to apply corresponding multi-sided platform (MSP) strategies to crowdsourcing 
environments. The MSP strategies discussed in the respective literature aim at realizing, 
maintaining and internalizing network externalities and controlling interactions between 
multiple divergent entities. Strategies discussed in crowdsourcing literature, in turn, aim 
at engaging only one entity, the crowd, and controlling quality of the co-created outcomes 
of only that one entity.  
To address the research gap, this qualitative empirical study explores strategies used to 
create a viable crowdsourcing goods delivery platform by studying nine goods delivery 
companies that work as an intermediary between the customers and delivery agents. The 
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aim of the interviews was to explore the strategic choices that the case companies had 
taken in their platform design and that contributed to platform viability and growth.  
The interviews were analysed following the Eisenhardt's (1989) instructions on building 
theory from case study research. I first explored the strategies and their antecedents in 
each case separately. Next, I compared these emergent patterns across cases to generalize 
and validate findings. A synthesised framework derived from recent crowdsourcing and 
MSP literature guided the analysis. The framework aided in evaluating the strategies 
related to platform openness, pricing and governance, which can be divided further into 
regulation of access and interactions and controlling creation. 
The study reveals multiple strategies that crowdsourcing goods delivery companies used 
to engage crowds, realize network effects and maintain quality. The crowdsourcing goods 
delivery platforms combined strategies typical of crowdsourcing and MSPs. However, 
also strategies that were not identified for crowdsourcing or MSPs in prior literature 
emerged in the analysis. 
The results show that most of the case companies preferred building a viable platform 
even at the cost of growing slowly. Firstly, they controlled growth through restricted 
geographical access and imposed vetting and training processes for the deliverers. These 
measures limited growth but helped growing a viable platform by securing beneficial 
connections between the users. 
The results also suggest that the use of the platform and crowdsourcing strategies is 
dependent on the stage of the platform life cycle. In the early phases of the platform life 
cycle, some of the case companies subsidized the deliverers while others were holding the 
monetization of the service in order to gather a sufficient amount of users required for 
securing network effects on the platform. While the market was evolving, the 
crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms started to subsidize the customers with lower 
prices. The cost of subsidizing was covered by lowering the deliverer remuneration or by 
including retailers that paid commission for the deliveries. When the volume eventually 
soared, the platforms moved away from crowdsourcing model where voluntary choice of 
tasks entailed unreliable deliveries. Instead, they employed some of the deliverers, 
separated picking phase as an isolated process and controlled the coupling of tasks and 
deliverers to gain higher efficiency, reliability and availability.  
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This study has theoretical and practical implications. First, I synthesize a framework that 
facilitates the structured analysis of strategies in crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms. 
Second, the study reveals strategies that crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms adopted 
and their motives. The findings show the strong influence of scale on strategic choices on 
platforms that prior research on the subject neglects. Further, these emergent strategies 
represent important practical managerial implications also for organizations that are 
considering exploiting crowds in their activities and for players experimenting new 
applications in crowdsourcing environment.  
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2. Literature review 
In the study, I derive the supporting theory from two rich fields of research, which I 
discuss in this section. In the section 2.1, I discuss the crowdsourcing environments and 
how crowds can be exploited in business. In the following section, 2.2, I explain how 
multi-sided markets affect to crowdsourcing platforms. In the section 2.3, I discuss the 
trade-offs of different platform designs. Next, the section 2.4 explains how 
crowdsourcing platforms engage their crowds in multi-sided markets. The section 2.5, in 
turn, goes through strategies that crowdsourcing platforms use to control quality. Lastly, 
in the section 2.6, I present the research gap derived from preceding sections and form 
two research questions to address it.  
2.1. Crowdsourcing in business 
In their frequently cited article, Estellés-Arolas and González-Ladrón-de-Guevara (2012, 
pp. 197) define crowdsourcing as “a type of participative online activity in which an 
individual, an institution, a non-profit organization, or company proposes to a group of 
individuals of varying knowledge, heterogeneity, and number, via a flexible open call, the 
voluntary undertaking of a task”. In this study, I refer to the former, proposing party as 
crowdsourcer and to the latter, proposed party as crowds. The definition varies in 
literature and crowdsourcing may also refer to an activity practiced solely by profit-
oriented companies (Kleemann & Voß 2008; Howe 2006). In the master’s thesis, 
however, I refer to the previous, broader view, as the crowdsourcing models and 
relationships between different entities in MSPs may be more complex.  
Companies can fundamentally change their business model by leveraging crowds. In 
essence, they may outsource a function once performed by employees to an undefined 
network of people (Howe 2006). A company, as a crowdsourcer, can exploit crowds to 
create value, from which it captures a share of profit and shares the revenues with the 
crowd (Kohler 2015). Apart from the economic compensation, these rewards for the 
crowd can come in the form of social recognition, self-esteem, or the development of 
individual skills (Estellés-Arolas & González-Ladrón-de-Guevara 2012). The advantages 
of crowdsourcing are used to deliver a company’s products and services in a more 
efficient, effective, reliable, personal, or faster way (Kohler 2015).  
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Indeed, the advantages of crowdsourcing are numerous. Firstly, a crowdsourcer may 
improve quality of its products and services by using consumer knowledge. By 
crowdsourcing its traditional development activities, a company is, in fact, outsourcing its 
processes to its customers, as the customers and the crowds that are creating the value can 
be overlapping groups of people. Thus, the customers use their own preferences and 
knowledge in creating value, products and services. Hence, a very compelling value 
proposition is created. (Kohler 2015; Kleemann & Voß 2008) 
Secondly, crowdsourcing may improve overall efficiency by reducing costs and 
increasing productivity. A company can avoid high fixed costs by replacing employees 
with independent contractors. Collaborating with a large amount of these contractors also 
potentially reduces the time spent in developing (Satzger et al. 2013; Kohler 2015; 
Kleemann & Voß 2008). A large amount of contributors developing designs for a product 
leads into a vast amount of ideas in short time. The crowdsourcers has to then solely 
develop a system to pick the best solution and, perhaps, deliver it to the end customer.  
Further, applying the attractive reward mechanisms potentially results in remunerating 
these individuals significantly less for the contribution than it is worth for the firm 
(Kleemann & Voß 2008).  
Moreover, crowdsourcing companies move some of the risks to the collaborators. In 
product development projects where crowds take part into the design phase the customer 
commitment is gathered before the product is manufactured (Kohler 2015), which partly 
ensures the future sales. The individual collaborators also take the risks associated with 
possible unexpected costs of value creation by using their own resources. If a 
crowdsourcer promises a certain reward for a task, the individual who carries out the task 
takes the risk in profitability, as he or she receives the same reward despite the amount of 
time and effort he or she put into the task.  
2.2. Crowdsourcing platform in multi-sided markets 
Crowdsourcing platforms connect two or more user groups, such as the crowds and the 
end customers. For example, one of the largest crowdsourcing platforms, Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (AMT), allows any company to distribute simple tasks for regular 
people to perform (Satzger et al. 2013). Similarly, Yahoo Answers!, a questions and 
answers portal, connects people who ask questions with those who answer the questions. 
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A common denominator for these two platforms is that they both connect multiple sides 
and operate themselves solely as intermediates. 
Therefore, instead of considering crowds as a stand-alone entity, they should be viewed 
as a part of a platform that incorporates multiple user groups that have their own distinct 
roles and incentives. In these multi-sided platforms (MSP) crowds are not the only user 
entity to be engaged. In effect, in MSPs, the opposite user groups attract each other, and 
the platform provider, who manages the platform, only enables interactions between 
them. Therefore, it is necessary to understand how other external user groups affect the 
crowds’ participation and how the monetary benefits are designed so that they attract all 
the users groups, not just the crowds.  
MSPs coordinate, in essence, the demand of distinct groups of customers who benefit 
from each other in some way (Evans 2003). More specifically, MSPs are technologies, 
products or services that mainly create value by enabling direct interactions between two 
or more customer or participant groups (Hagiu 2014). When MSPs are able to 
successfully connect distinct participant groups with complementary needs, the platform 
creates significant value to the participants groups due to reduced search costs and 
transaction costs (Hagiu 2014). Hence, the platform users do not need to search and 
transact with multiple partners separately through different platforms but allocate all the 
interactions through one platform, instead.  
Network effects, which illustrate the tractive forces between the distinct user groups, are 
the foundation of MSPs. A MSP realizes cross-side network effects and increases social 
surplus, if it is able to internalize the one participant group’s existing externalities for 
another (Evans 2003; Liebowitz & Margolis 1994). The higher the number of the 
participants, the more opposing sides benefit from each other and the value of the 
platform increases (Hagiu 2014; Evans 2003; Eisenmann et al. 2006). For instance, in 
crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms, increase in the amount of deliverers would 
provide more frequent deliveries, which yields higher value for the ordering customers. 
The increase in the amount of customers, in turn, provides deliverers the better 
opportunities to earn. Consequently, the cross-side network effects eventually grow the 
platform, as opposite user entities attract one another. 
 8 
A growing platform enjoys increasing returns of scale. Users are willing to pay more for 
joining into a larger network (Eisenmann et al. 2006) as it offers more value to them. 
Economies of scale may also lead to significant barriers to entry for other players, which 
allows the platform to gain a superior position in the market (Hagiu 2014). 
Therefore, achieving desired network effects is the most critical goal for platform 
providers. Firstly, attracting all the sides onto the platform is a challenge for every MSP 
in the early phases of their life cycles. Because none of the sides will join without the 
users on the other side, the problem is to get enough of initial users on one side, i.e., the 
critical mass to join the platform. Cross-side network effects ensure that critical mass 
attracts more participants on the other side (Hagiu, 2014; Evans, 2003; Eisenmann, Parker 
and Van Alstyne, 2006). This results in a self-reliant platform, which grows on its own.  
Secondly, MSPs need to avoid the negative network effects. Negative same-side effects 
realize when interactions are negative and harmful. They may surface due to low quality 
on the platform or excess competition. For example, a large amount of users on one side 
leads to excess competition, which again leads to lower profit margins and value for the 
users (Hagiu 2014; Eisenmann et al. 2006). Harmful connections and interactions 
between the users of different sides, in turn, lead to negative cross-side network effects 
that prevent platforms from growing. In the case of the crowdsourcing goods delivery 
platforms, too many deliverers on one side, which denotes lower profits, and low quality 
of goods deliveries lead to negative network effects. 
2.3. Platform design and its openness 
For platforms, perhaps the most prominent strategic decision is how many sides to 
include on the platform (Rysman 2009; Eisenmann et al. 2008). Rysman (2009) refers to 
this initial platform design decision as openness. Apart from how many sides to pursue, 
openness refers also to decisions over how a platform relates to competing platforms 
(Rysman 2009). It may choose to be compatible with competing platforms or even 
integrate with them.  
Contrary to access regulation, which I discuss later, openness does not regulate the access 
of single users of a user group. Instead, it involves strategic decisions whether to open an 
access for a user group, such as deliverers, consumers, advertisers or retailers, with a 
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specific task and role onto the platform. The more open the platform is, the more sides, 
i.e., distinct user groups, it hosts. In the case of delivery services, an open platform would 
have deliverers as their own separate, crowdsourced entity in addition to orderers and 
retailers. On the contrary, if a platform is more closed, it might serve only one side, e.g., 
customers, and in turn maintain deliverers as their own employees. Thus, the strategic 
decisions addressing the platform openness determine how many user entities a platform 
should have when pursuing growth and quality. Platform openness has a fundamental 
effect on the pricing and governance strategies. 
Platform providers are able to alter openness. They may open an access to the platform 
for a new participant group or alternatively close the access for the existing side 
(Eisenmann et al. 2008). By closing platform for a side the platform continues offering 
their products and services as its own operations (Hagiu 2014; Eisenmann et al. 2008; 
Rysman 2009). In practice, closing denotes acquiring a side by hiring its participants, for 
instance (Hagiu 2014) or developing own capabilities to offer the same products and 
services (Eisenmann et al. 2008).  
Closing a platform can also be partial. For instance, many of the Windows OS’s software 
applications, such as web browsing, disk management and streaming media, used to be 
provided solely by third parties. However, Microsoft started to develop its own 
applications in parallel with the third party developers. Eisenmann et al. (2008) refer to 
this strategy as closing the platform, as the participants of the respective side find it more 
difficult to compete once the platform provider offers a substitute.  
Openness yields significant economic trade-offs. On the one hand, more sides lead to 
potentially larger cross-side network effects, larger scale and diversified sources of 
revenues (Hagiu & Wright 2015; Hagiu 2014). On the other, more sides may also create 
excess complexity on the platform and entail conflicting interests between the sides 
(ibid.). Further, if a platform decides to outsource activities that it previously had under 
its own control to an external user group, it loses the control on the quality of the products 
or services (Hagiu 2014).   
Therefore, a crowdsourcing goods delivery platform may want to alter platform openness 
throughout the platform life cycle to pursue different strategic goals. In general, platform 
providers can increase supply by operating on the side where the amount of participants is 
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still insufficient to attract the other side and create strong network effects (Hagiu 2014; 
Rysman 2009). Once the network effects are realized and there are enough participants on 
both sides for the platform to keep on growing the platform provider can start to operate 
as a sole intermediary. Similarly, crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms would be able 
to offer the deliveries themselves from the beginning until the amount of crowdsourced 
deliverers is sufficient for providing frequent deliveries, thus higher value, for the end 
customer.  
2.4. Strategies to engage the crowds and realize network effects 
As the company benefits from the crowd, the crowd has to benefit from the company. If a 
crowdsourcing business fails to engage the crowds, the advantages of crowdsourcing will 
not realize. Crowdsourcers may engage their crowds both with monetary rewards and 
rewards that address crowds’ intrinsic motivation. In multi-sided markets, the rewards 
have to be designed in a way that they do not attract only the crowds but also the end 
customers and perhaps other user entities.  
Pricing strategies 
One way to engage the crowds is to create attractive monetary incentives onto the 
platform. In crowdsourced-based businesses, this pricing challenge culminates into 
questions what is the value created in the collaboration that is charged from the end 
customer, and what are the rewards or shares of revenues distributed to the crowds 
(Kohler 2015). Because individual creators choose the tasks voluntarily, it is difficult to 
determine a sufficient reward or remuneration that motivates the creator but is not too 
high for the crowdsourcer that aims at turning a profit, either (Satzger et al. 2013). The 
crowdsourcer has to take the nature of the task, external factors, such as number of 
available workers, and environmental influences, like weather, into account. However, 
the pricing mechanism can also be based on an open pricing model where users determine 
the prices themselves thus relieving a crowdsourcer from defining the monetary reward in 
advance (ibid.).  
In multi-sided markets, on the other hand, the price is also dependent on how 
participation of users on one side affects the participation on the other and how much 
profit can be extracted from the participation (Rysman 2009). In fact, the price for one 
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side might be even lower than the marginal cost for that side (Parker & Alstyne 2003; 
Rysman 2009). Indeed, MSPs need to offer the product or a service for free or at 
subsidized prizes to at least one side of the platform in order to attract the initial users 
(Hagiu 2014; Evans 2003). To cover the cost of subsidizing, the platform charges the 
other side(s) more, which makes them the money-side (Hagiu 2014; Eisenmann et al. 
2006). Hence, in their pricing strategies, MSPs divide their users into the subsidy side 
users who in large numbers attract the other, money-side.  
There are multiple factors to concern when determining an optimal pricing strategy for a 
multi-sided crowdsourcing platform. Firstly, the platform should identify the money sides 
and the subsidy sides. The former gets charged more, as the users on this side are the ones 
that benefit the most from the other sides or are capable of charging the other sides more 
(Hagiu 2014; Armstrong 2006). The latter, in turn, consists of the most price-sensitive 
users or users that provide large externality and value for the other sides on the platform 
(Hagiu 2014; Rysman 2009). Thus, they should be subsidized by offering them lower 
prices or higher remuneration (Armstrong 2006) or by strongly supporting and investing 
in their creation activities (Evans 2003). Therefore, subsidy side represents the critical 
mass that needs to be attracted first to join the platform in order to encourage the other 
groups’ participation. This form of subsidy pricing is common and necessary for MSPs in 
the early phase of the life cycle to create initial user base, which is then capitalized later 
(Rysman 2009). However, for crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms, it is still unclear 
which one, the delivering crowds or the ordering customers, is the subsidy side and which 
one is the money side. 
Secondly, the money and subsidy sides might change when the market evolves, which 
affects the pricing. The platform might attract extremely valuable users onto the platform, 
which reduces the prices or increases remuneration for the users on the respective side 
(Evans 2003; Eisenmann et al. 2006). MSPs may also need to increase the level of 
quality, which they tend do by charging more the side that is needed to produce high 
quality, as high initial investments help weed out the low quality players (Hagiu 2014). 
This way pricing has additional quality benefits as it can be used also to regulate access to 
the platform, as I will discuss later.  
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Non-pecuniary rewards 
However, achieving strong engagement in the crowds requires also implementing non-
pecuniary incentives (Boudreau & Hagiu 2008). Indeed, pricing mechanisms are 
inefficient tools when engaging and motivating people. In addition to the monetary 
incentives, rewards may address crowds’ intrinsic motivations, such as social recognition 
and skill development (ibid.). Engagement further increases, if the crowds are also 
affiliated with the community (Boudreau & Hagiu 2009; Kohler 2015) or attracted by the 
opportunity of working flexibly according to their individual habits, e.g. working hours 
(Satzger et al. 2013).  
For example, TopCoder, a vendor of outsourced software project, has been able to engage 
a community of 20 000 actively contributing developers in regularly organized contests. 
The community takes part into contests where they compete on developing software 
according to software buyer requisites. Winners receive cash prizes that vary between 
hundreds up to millions of dollars. Yet, TopCoder ends up paying less than it would have 
paid for all the joining developers. Most contributors do not receive anything and still 
they are engaged to continuously take part into the contests. TopCoder is engaging coders 
with non-pecuniary incentives intrinsic motivation that are typical of coder communities, 
such as learning, status and recognition and affiliation with the community. (Boudreau & 
Hagiu 2008) 
Sometimes even the freedom and the flexibility of working in crowdsourced-based 
models seems to attract crowds as such. Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) allows 
companies to distribute simple tasks with short description onto their platform where 
individuals execute them. The tasks include transcribing short interviews and textual 
analyses of pictures, which still human performs better than a computer. The rewards are 
relatively low, from $0.02 to few dollars (Ipeirotis 2010), but motivators such as being 
productive (Kleemann & Voß 2008) and working flexibly with occasionally appealing 
tasks (Satzger et al. 2013) has attracted 250 000 crowdsourcing workers on AMT’s 
platform (ibid.).  
Crowdsourcers may also engage the crowds by amplifying exemplary behavior, which 
also contributes to higher quality. Kohler (2015) states that in order to engage the crowd 
and ensure high quality output crowdsourcing platform should empower and give 
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recognition to the best performing individuals and their work in order to amplify their 
behavior in others in the community and give incentives for the crowds to improve. For 
instance, in their auction-based crowdsourcing model, Satzger et al. (2013) motivate the 
crowds by integrating assessment of tasks into the model in order to encourage skill 
development within the community. Similarly, Yahoo Answers! amplifies desirable 
behavior by giving points to users who answer to the questions and reducing points from 
those who ask them (Satzger et al. 2013). The mechanism encourages users to also 
answer to the questions and not just ask them.  
2.5. Strategies to control quality on crowdsourcing platforms 
Ensuring quality on crowdsourcing platforms is challenging but necessary. Low quality 
creation on the platform does not make the market unattractive only for the end customers 
but also for the participants to produce high quality products and services (Hagiu 2014). 
Strength of the network effects is not only determined by the number of users and the 
interactions between them but also by their quality (ibid.). Thus, low quality on the 
platform might lead to negative network effects that eventually result in network failure, 
where the platform fails to engage and attract its users.  
There are at least three aspects typical of crowdsourcing platforms that affect quality of 
the co-created product or service. First, easy access onto a platform makes managing 
tasks and assuring quality challenging. On the one hand, by keeping the platform 
accessible crowdsourcers are able to benefit from large masses of co-creators with 
different knowledge and interests. On the other, an easily accessible platform might lead 
to a heterogenic mass of creators who may join and leave at any time, which complicates 
manageability of the tasks (Satzger et al. 2013). The unrestricted access also attracts 
undesirable participants that produce low quality, which might result in harmful negative 
connections between the platform users (Boudreau & Hagiu 2008).  
Second, there are limitations to what extent the crowd can deliver value. The limitations 
include the requisite qualifications for performing certain high-sensitivity tasks and 
crowds’ limited expertise and knowledge, which tends to relate only to the visible part of 
a crowdsourcing company’s business. Thus, crowds might disregard the possible other 
insights into the business that are available for its employees. (Kleemann & Voß 2008) 
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Third, loose coupling of the tasks and the crowdsourcing individuals contributes to low 
quality. In crowdsourcing platforms, the crowds may choose the tasks themselves, 
whereas in companies tasks are usually assigned straight to the employees. Voluntary 
booking of a task does not take the individuals’ abilities or the fit for the task into 
account, only their own preferences and willingness (Satzger et al. 2013). Hence, quality 
of performance varies significantly on a crowdsourcing platform, as coupling is more 
difficult to control.  
Crowdsourcing platforms address these issues with various quality governance strategies. 
They can be divided into strategies regulating access, which involves determining the 
users who can join the platform (Hagiu 2014), regulating interaction, which involves 
controlling and restricting interactions between and within the entities on the platform 
(Hagiu 2014), and controlling creation of crowds on the platform (Boudreau & Hagiu 
2008). These strategies ensure positive network effects on the platform and help in 
engaging users in order to make the platform grow.  
Regulating access 
Quality may be governed proactively by regulating access. The principal idea in 
regulating access is to ensure the suitability and the fit of all the members on different 
sides of a platform. By attracting only the right participants the likelihood of relevant 
connections between the users of opposing sides increases while the amount of negative 
interactions with potentially undesirable members decreases (Boudreau & Hagiu 2008). 
For instance, in crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms, relevant connection would 
realize between an orderer and a deliverer that are located close to each other. Contrary to 
openness strategies, regulating access simply concerns restricting single users’ access to 
the platform and does not involve determining the total number of the sides on the 
platform.  
In addition to ensuring desirable connections between the members of different sides, 
access regulation can also be used to avoid negative same-side network effects from 
realizing. Sometimes the number of members on one side of the platform may increase to 
excess leading into fiercer competition and thus downward price pressure and shrinking 
margins (Eisenmann et al. 2006), which in turn might reduce the incentives for member 
to invest in quality (Hagiu 2014). Positive network effects may turn into negative ones 
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that could lead into a market failure when grown strong. Therefore, regulating access by 
deliberately reducing the sheer number of participants on one side is necessary in certain 
conditions in order to maintain the network effects strong and positive (Eisenmann et al. 
2006). 
Measures to restrict access vary and are dependent on the context but their main goal is to 
ensure the participant fit. Similar to crowdsourcing goods delivery services, Uber, a 
crowdsourcing taxi service that connects passengers and drivers, screens the driver 
applicants with background checks. The background check is also followed by a short 
online training. eHarmony provides an example of two-side market that connects people 
to arrange a date. The platform ensures the participant fit by requiring applicants to 
complete a survey of 250 questions and then refusing the membership if they do not suit 
the platform’s requirements.  
Regulating interactions 
Regulating interactions is the more nuanced counterpart of the access regulation. It aims 
to achieve desired behavior in platform participants and in the interactions between them 
in order to realize positive network effects (Boudreau & Hagiu 2008) or simply to turn a 
profit. Platform providers can prevent some interactions totally or just restrict them. 
Regulating interaction addresses many challenges created by constantly growing 
platform. Firstly, a crowdsourcer may prevent interactions to support only positive 
connections. To avoid negative connections crowdsourcers may, for example, control the 
distribution of tasks to the individuals based on their abilities, the previous performance 
and other metrics (Satzger et al. 2013). The crowdsourcer thus restricts the interactions 
with those who are not suitable for the task or who usually produce low quality. 
Distributing the tasks in a more beneficial manner does not only contribute to quality but 
also to profitability. The approach also amplifies desirable behavior and thus engages 
crowds, as described earlier. 
Secondly, crowdsourcers can also totally prevent members of one side from interacting 
with the members on the other side. For instance, to ensure quality, the platform provider 
may want to audit the quality of the products created by crowds and verify whether the 
outcome qualifies for passing it to the end customer (Boudreau & Hagiu 2008). Crowds 
are thus exploited in value creation but they do not interact with the final customer. 
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Hence, in crowdsourcing-based businesses, regulating interactions is an effective strategy 
for controlling quality. The platform is capable of controlling and enhancing the outcome 
prior to delivering, or selling, it to the end-customer by limiting the relationships between 
the sides (Kohler 2015).  
Controlling creation 
To achieve higher quality crowdsourcing platforms also tend to impose control over the 
crowds’ creation. Creation refers here to the crowds’ value creation processes. In the 
crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms creation consists of activities related to picking 
and delivering the customer orders. The goal of imposing control on creation is to 
improve quality and make creation more efficient. Creation refers to the activities and 
work performed out by the crowds.  
Strategies for controlling creation restrict the variety of ways crowds may carry out the 
task, which improves manageability of crowdsourcing project. Controlling creation may 
occur as systemized production where a crowdsourcer organizes the work in more 
beneficial manner. For instance, crowdsourcing platform TopCoder has divided the 
customer projects into sequential, more manageable tasks. In addition to the software 
development, the company holds contests on software architecture, software design and 
testing. Thus, TopCoder is able to harness crowds in different part of the value chain 
making the creation processes more manageable and efficient. (Boudreau & Hagiu 2008) 
Crowdsourcing platforms’ focal strategies should concern engaging the crowds and 
controlling the quality. To engage the crowd, platforms need to create the right pricing 
and rewarding mechanisms. The former involves defining the sufficient pay for the 
individuals whereas the latter consists of intrinsic motivations, such as learning and desire 
for social recognition, and is more nuanced and more challenging counterpart of pricing 
in the platform design. Quality, on the other hand, tends to be maintained by regulating 
interactions between the customer and the crowds, regulating access to ensure the 
suitability of the participants and controlling the creation process of the crowds.  
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2.6. Research questions 
The theory section yields an interesting research gap. There is little we know about 
crowdsourcing in the service domain and in the domain of goods deliveries, in particular. 
Prior empirical research and the theory on crowdsourcing presented in the previous 
section are limited to crowdsourcing product development applications. Crowdsourcing 
research mainly stems from various real-life applications in product development and 
configuration (Kleemann & Voß 2008), such as open source software projects (Boudreau 
& Hagiu 2008), problem solving, open innovation (Satzger et al. 2013; Brabham 2008) 
and product design competitions (Kohler 2015; Kleemann & Voß 2008).  
Crowdsourcing in the services domain and in goods deliveries, in particular, differs 
significantly from crowdsourcing product development practices. Unlike in product 
development, in goods deliveries interactions and exchange of goods between the crowds 
and the end customers are inevitable and, to an extent, beyond control of the platform 
providers in the service businesses. Crowds need to deliverer the goods to the end 
customer, which makes quality control challenging, as the crowdsourcer is not able to 
inspect the quality during this exchange. In crowdsourcing product development, in turn, 
crowds are capable of working independently in isolation and do not necessarily need to 
interact with an end customer in order to carry out the task. For instance, in integrator 
platforms (coined by Kohler 2015), the crowdsourcer, is able to evaluate the quality of 
the co-created product prior to selling it to a end customer. The crowds execute the tasks 
in isolation from the end customer. Therefore, it is unclear how crowdsourcers operating 
in the services domain and in goods delivery platforms, in particular, are able to apply 
strategies used in crowdsourced product development. 
Furthermore, crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms tend to operate in multi-sided 
markets. Platforms multiple sides affect each other positively growing the platform or 
negatively making the platform less attractive for its users. Crowds are thus only one side 
that needs to be considered when building a functioning, viable platform. It is not yet 
perfectly understood how crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms may apply common 
MSP strategies, i.e., openness, pricing and governance strategies, to crowdsourcing 
environments, and vice versa. 
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To explore this research gap, I form two research questions that aim at understanding the 
strategies used in crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms and the reasoning behind the 
strategic decisions: 
Q1. How do crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms engage their deliverers, realize 
network effects and control quality in multi-sided markets? 
Q2. How do the platform strategies change throughout the life cycle of a crowdsourcing 
goods delivery platform?  
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3. Research methods 
The aim of this multiple-case study is to explore the strategies that crowdsourcing goods 
delivery platforms use to engage users, realize network effects and control quality in 
multi-sided markets. I use the synthetized framework, presented in the theory section, to 
inspect how openness, pricing and governance strategies, are applied to the 
crowdsourcing platforms that operate in the domain of deliveries. The objective was also 
to understand the reasoning behind these strategic decisions and how they change 
throughout the platform life cycles.  
This section presents the approach I adopted to explore these strategies and answer the 
two research questions. First section, 3.1, presents the research context. The following 
section, 3.2, describes the data collection procedures that involved choosing the nine case 
companies, conducting the interviews and triangulating the tentative results with archival 
data. Lastly in 3.3, I explain the data analysis process which was an iterative process 
following Eisenhardt (1989) instructions on building theory from case study research. 
3.1. Research context 
This study explores strategies used in nine crowdsourcing platforms organizing delivery 
of goods, which include groceries, restaurant food and other goods. The platforms do not 
deliver the goods themselves; instead they solely match users who need any goods 
delivered with those who are willing and able to deliver them. The case companies 
operated in the domain of goods deliveries but had slightly different business models. 
Seven of the case companies were crowdsourcing their deliveries to the individuals, one 
company exploited a large pool of part-time employees and another passed customer 
orders for a large base of existing delivery companies. A common denominator between 
all of the companies, however, was that they all operated in multi-sided markets, 
connecting at least two distinct participant groups. Although all of the companies were 
less than five years old, they ranged from those still operating with seed capital and in one 
city to those funded with millions of dollars and operating in multiple markets. The 
companies were also based in different geographic locations in North America and 
Europe.  
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Crowdsourcing goods deliveries are still a nascent market, where the best practices are 
still explored and that is characterized by several entrants experimenting with different 
business models. As typical of nascent markets, the fast industry growth has been 
allowing the players to grow with it without facing intensive competition yet, though 
crowded with new entrants. However, many of these entrants will sort out during the 
process, and only few will grow to a leading position. The emergence of wide body of 
players in the industry is mainly driven by novel mobile technologies, innovative 
applications in social networks and increased start-up funding.  
Crowdsourced deliveries represent only one branch of the growing collaboration 
economy currently led by Uber, AirBnB, Instacart and alike. The collaboration or the 
sharing economy is filled with successful and notorious examples of how crowds can be 
harnessed for business. The industry is still in its infancy and the players are facing 
several complications and legislative constraints. Although the market has predominantly 
been growing with the leading players, people’s preferences towards sharing economy 
and legislative factors still hinder the growth.  
3.2. Methodological approach 
I chose the qualitative case study method to approach exploring the research gap. Case 
studies are the optimal strategy for exploring phenomena in real-life contexts (Yin 2003). 
Case studies are also preferred when answering to “how” and “why” questions. These 
questions are explanatory by their nature and address causal relationships (ibid.) Cases 
and, for instance, conducting interviews enable the access to explore these relationships. 
The qualitative methods, in turn, are used to understanding why or why not the 
relationships hold (Eisenhardt 1989). Thus, qualitative case study is optimal when 
exploring strategic decisions and their antecedents in real-life environments. 
Although this study is based only on nine companies, they provide basis for generalizable 
theory. A common prejudice against the case study strategy is that such limited empirical 
data would not provide sufficient basis for scientific generalization (Yin 2003; Eisenhardt 
& Graebner 2007). However, findings derived from a case study can be generalized to 
other situations through analytic generalization (Yin 2012). Analytic generalization stems 
from study’s theoretical framework to establish a theory that could be applicable to other 
situations (ibid.).  
 21 
Furthermore, choosing multiple cases improves the theory’s generalizability. Multiple-
case study enables comparison of cases to reveal whether emergent findings recur in 
several cases or is idiosyncratic to a single case (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). Each new 
case may be used to support, reject or shape tentative propositions that emerge from 
individual cases (Eisenhardt 1989). Accordingly, this study’s data analysis involves both 
within-case and cross-case analysis of nine cases, as described later in this section.  
3.3. Data collection procedures 
I embarked on the selection of case companies with wide exploration of players in the 
crowdsourcing delivery ecosystem in different geographic markets. The aim was to find 
more than six companies that exploited individuals (referred as crowdsourcing) in 
organizing deliveries of goods and only operated as intermediaries between these 
individuals and the parties that needed something delivered. Preferably, the prospect case 
companies should also use novel technologies, such as mobile platforms, in matching 
these two entities. Thus, I used sources like Investors’ Angel1, CrunchBase2 and other 
websites focused on start-up funding from different countries in Europe and North 
America to find newly established and funded companies from this nascent market.  
After a vast search I narrowed down the number of prospect case companies. I defined a 
high-level outline of companies’ business models based on archival data such as 
companies’ web sites and media articles to be able to categorize them and confirm that 
they were crowdsourcing delivery platforms instead of traditional delivery services. I 
sorted out the companies that were no longer active in order to be able to arrange the 
interviews (except for the company, pseudonym IndigoDeliverer that had been ceased but 
been a part of a larger organization and thus provided a potential case to explore 
antecedents of a market failure). In addition, some of the companies had employed their 
crowdsourced deliverers under a full-time employee contract. However, these companies 
were not excluded since they represented an apparent phenomenon in the industry. 
Finally, 50 potential case companies and an array of different business models were 
identified. I categorized the companies into crowdsourced grocery, restaurant and local 
goods delivery platforms and crowdshipping platforms. I did not limit the number of 
                                                
1 https://investorsangel.com 
2 https://www.crunchbase.com 
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potential case companies more at this phase yet, as I would need to narrow it down due to 
the companies’ reluctance to be interviewed and share information about their business.  
The search for prospect case companies was followed by the inquiry phase. I started 
contacting the potential case companies by sending inquiries for prospect of interviews. I 
aimed to get a coherent sample of case companies from the aforementioned categories 
complying with Eisenhardt's (1989) instructions on the theoretical selection of cases. 
Finally, the process led to a desirable coherence. A scope of nine companies from 
different categories were identified: three crowdsourced grocery delivery platforms, two 
crowdshipping companies, where the focus was on long-distance deliveries, two local 
crowdshipping companies, where the focus was on deliveries within a city, one delivery 
business intermediate exploiting existing delivery businesses and one restaurant delivery 
service. Exceptionally, the last two were not crowdsourced, by correct definition. Instead, 
they pooled the deliveries into their vast bases of existing delivery companies and part-
time employees, respectively. 
This group of case companies represents an ideal sample for theory development. It 
provides a variety of distinct cases and examples from the industry of crowdsourced 
goods delivery platforms: One company exploited a large pool of delivery businesses and 
other a large pool of part-time employees; one platform had experienced a market failure 
and another received millions in funding; some delivered as delicate items as groceries; 
one had turned some of the deliverers into employees.  
The case companies are presented shortly below. The suffixes of the pseudonyms 
illustrate the domain each case company was operating in. Grocer refers to grocery 
deliveries, Shipper refers to crowdshipping, Deliverer refers to local deliveries, and Food 
refers to restaurant deliveries. Throughout the study I will refer to these groups of case 
companies, as business models in one domain remind each other. However, I use the term 
crowdshipping company or crowdshipping platform to refer to BurgundyDeliverer, 
IndigoDeliverer, BlueShipper and PurpleShipper. 
GreenGrocer. Founded in 2015, GreenGrocer is a crowdsourced grocery delivery 
service available in the most populous areas of two cities. The company is focused on 
same-day and on-demand grocery deliveries and carries out both the picking and 
delivering of groceries. The company has multiple partner grocers to support its business. 
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Unlike other grocery delivery platforms, GreenGrocer has employed two of its deliverers. 
The company has received more than $500k in funding. 
OrangeGrocer. OrangeGrocer was founded in 2012 and it had spread into four cities. 
Similarly to GreenGrocer, the company offers same-day grocery deliveries carried out by 
crowds who pick and deliver the groceries. The company has partnerships with grocers. 
The company has received $100k in funding. 
YellowGrocer. Founded in 2015, YellowGrocer crowdsources grocery deliveries and is 
available countrywide for deliverers to join. The locations of registered deliverers 
determine the available areas for ordering groceries. Unlike OrangeGrocer and 
GreenGrocer, YellowGrocer has not established partnerships with retailers and allows 
deliverers to pick and deliverer from any store. The company has not received any 
funding yet. 
BlueShipper. Launched in 2014, this crowdshipping platform BlueShipper connects 
those who need anything shipped and those who are capable of doing the task on their 
route. In addition, the company constantly carries out various pilots and experiments, 
such as grocery home delivery, with temporary partner retailers. Apart from the pilots, the 
platform is available countrywide. The company is still funded by seed capital.  
PurpleShipper. Founded in 2010, PurpleShipper is a crowdshipping platform that 
connects people that need something shipped with those who can do the task on their 
way. The platform’s deliveries have mainly taken place within one country. The company 
has not engaged into partnerships with other businesses. The company has received more 
than $800k in funding. 
BurgundyDeliverer. BurgundyDeliverer was established in 2014, and it is a platform 
connecting people that need something delivered within a city with those who are capable 
and willing to do the task. At the time of writing the platform had just been launched and 
has expanded into two cities. The company had not partnerships with other businesses. 
The company was still funded by seed capital. 
IndigoDeliverer. IndigoDeliverer was established in 2014 as a part of a large 
organization until it was ceased a year later. IndigoDeliverer offered its parent 
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organization’s consumer customers to get their parcels delivered home by anyone 
registered in the system. The service was available in one city. 
AuburnDeliverer. Founded in 2013, AuburnDeliverer offers its last-mile delivery 
solution to retailers. In essence, the company sends retailer customers’ requests to its 
large base of partner delivery companies who deliver the product to the end customer. 
Unlike other case companies, the company does not have its own application. Instead 
they integrate their API into a retailer’s web store so that the end customer may choose 
their same-day home delivery. The company’s services are available in one city. The 
company has received more than $500k in funding. 
MaroonFood. Founded in 2014, the company has been able to expand into major cities 
of ten countries and receive a generous funding. MaroonFood is a restaurant delivery 
service that allows customers to order meals that are cooked by the restaurant and 
delivered by the company’s own employees. The company was acquired in 2015 but kept 
its original brand.  
There were nine interviews, in total. Due to the relatively small size and novelty of the 
companies, one interview was held in each case company and most of the interviewees 
represented a part of the original founding team. The interviewees were co-founders, 
CEOs, heads of product and operations and a public relation manager. The interviews 
were held mainly using Skype and only one individual was interviewed at once except for 
one interview that was held face-to-face with two interviewees in the same session. The 
interviews lasted from 40 minutes to 70 minutes. Each session was recorded to enable 
precise transcribing.  
To support the semi-structured interviews an interview guide (see Appendix) was created 
to outline the themes discussed in the interviews and, later, to confirm some of the 
discoveries derived from the previous interview in the following session. The interview 
guide consisted of open-ended question only to outline related themes but it was not 
followed strictly. Rather the interviews followed discussion’s natural flow and the 
interviewees were encouraged to lengthy conversations with follow-up questions. The 
interview guide was shaped only to an extent to be able to get a more extensive or precise 
view on emerged patterns. The interview questions concerned the companies’ business 
models and were aimed to understand the underlying reasons behind models’ design.  
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The archival data that was collected in the previous phase was extended for those in the 
final sample and used to triangulate and validate the qualitative interview data. The 
archive data consisted mainly of information on case companies’ websites but also media 
articles that the companies were promoting on their websites. This resulted into total of 
27 media articles.  
The summary of the case companies and the data collections methods is shown in the 
table 1.  
Table 1: Data collected from the case companies  
Case company Founded Description Interviews 
Media 
articles Web sites 
OrangeGrocer 2012 Grocery 
deliveries 
1 4 1 
GreenGrocer 2015 Grocery 
deliveries 
1 x 2p 6 1 
YellowGrocer 2015 Grocery 
deliveries 
1 3 1 
BlueShipper 2014 Crowdshipping 1 2 1 
PurpleShipper 2010 Crowdshipping 1 2 1 
BurgundyDeliverer 2014 Local 
crowdshipping 
1 3 1 
IndigoDeliverer 2014 Local 
crowdshipping 
1 3 1 
AuburnDeliverer 2013 Delivery 
business 
intermediate 
1 3 1 
MaroonFood 2014 Restaurant 
deliverer 
1 3 1 
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3.4. Data analysis  
The qualitative interview data were analysed in an iterative process following 
Eisenhardt's (1989) instructions on building theory from case study research. After the 
interviews were transcribed, I embarked on the within-case analysis which involved 
detailed examination of the case companies separately and identifying of unique tentative 
themes. I used the insights derived from the prior literature to limit the analysis to specific 
issues linked to concepts of crowdsourcing and multi-sided markets. I first categorized 
the themes into groups defined in the theory section: strategies that related to engaging 
users and controlling quality. In all the interviews, various pricing strategies were used to 
engage users. However, strategies to control quality did not only appear to pursue high 
quality but also aimed at engaging users. Therefore, I developed themes into more 
specified constructs that emerged from the interviews: pricing strategies, regulating 
access, regulating interactions and controlling creation. In these constructs, the strategies 
aimed both at engaging users and controlling quality.  
Few case companies aimed at engaging users and controlling quality in other ways, too. 
In the OrangeGrocer, GreenGrocer and BlueShipper cases, I identified strategies that 
changed the initial platform design both to engage users and control quality. The 
interviewees in respective companies mentioned these strategies as crucial for their 
platform development. This group of patterns was labelled as openness according to the 
theory section.  
After the unique patterns of the cases were identified, I moved to the cross-case analysis, 
where these themes and relationships were compared across cases. Each case revealed 
evidences that supported, rejected or shaped the tentative propositions emerged from 
individual cases. This process led to more generalizable constructs that the case study 
sample supported and limited. The cross-case analysis revealed that scale affected the 
case companies. I noticed that the companies used strategies differently depending on the 
order volumes they had been able to reach. The reasoning behind the strategies choices 
revealed that companies needed to reach certain thresholds in the amounts of users before 
being able to adopt some of the emerged strategies. For example, the reason for only two 
case companies, MaroonFood and GreenGrocer, hiring their deliverers was only because 
they were able to reach higher volumes than others. Thus, the strategies were not 
idiosyncratic for these case companies but applicable to all when certain conditions, high 
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volume, took place. Therefore, I needed to analyse the cases taking into account that their 
strategies had altered throughout the stages in their life cycles. Accordingly, the Findings 
section reflects strategies through the life cycle viewpoint. 
Further, these constructs were constantly compared with prior literature, too, iterating 
toward an empirically valid theory that is strongly supported by the data. Some of the 
emerged themes required me to review and shape the original framework and theory and 
even the research questions. 
In the Findings section, the findings are presented in their corresponding categories: 
openness, pricing, regulating access, regulating interactions and controlling creation. 
Some of the emergent concepts were brought up already in the Literature Review section. 
However, I recognized also new concepts that prior literature on crowdsourcing and 
MSPs had not identified. I present the identified patterns in the following Findings 
section.  
 28 
4. Findings 
This section presents the results of the data analysis. The analysis reveals various 
openness, pricing and governance strategies that all the case companies used to realize 
network effects, engage crowds and control quality. The analysis further shows that the 
different strategies were used in different stages of the case companies’ life cycles. Also 
the nature of delivered products and the business model affected the use of these 
strategies. For instance, grocery and food delivery platforms need to secure frequency of 
deliveries because their products are consumed on a daily basis. Long-distance 
crowdshipping companies, in turn, need to focus on a larger area than locally operating 
platforms. I elaborate the strategies related to openness, pricing, access and interaction 
regulation and controlling creation in the following five sections, respectively. I reflect 
them through the company’s business model and discuss their relationships. The results 
describe the reasoning behind each strategic decision. 
Summary. The summary of all the strategies used in multi-sided crowdsourced platforms 
is shown in the Figure 1, below. The figure illustrates the proposed causal relationships of 
the strategies used in crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms. Stage 1 represents the 
early stages of the platform life cycle, when volumes of deliveries and the number of 
users are low. At stage 1, companies’ strategies aim at gathering the initial users, the 
critical mass, and thus grow the platform. At stage 2, the platform has been able to gather 
sufficient amount of users to realize network effects between them. At stage 3, the 
platform already grows itself and volumes are high enough to support the strategies 
presented in the top right corner. At this point, the platform owners seem to weigh the 
quality of the platform the most and adopt the strategies accordingly. All the strategies at 
sequential stages are not exclusive, as explained later.  
The number in the parentheses shows the amount of the case companies that had adopted 
the strategy. The number after a plus mark illustrates the additional companies that were 
intending or planning to use the strategy.  
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4.1. Openness 
The platform openness determines the number of the sides that are included onto the 
platform and how a platform relates to the competing platforms, as discussed in the 
theory section (Rysman 2009; Eisenmann et al. 2008). The more open the platform is, the 
more sides, i.e., distinct users groups it hosts. Platforms may increase openness by adding 
more sides or alternatively decrease openness by reducing the amount of sides and 
becoming more closed. In addition, offering the same products and services with one of 
the sides on the platform can be considered as partly closing the side, as the participants 
of the respective side will find it more difficult to compete once the platform provider 
offers the substitutes (Eisenmann et al. 2008). Thus, a platform is open when it has 
multiple sides where users compete only with other users within the same side. In turn, 
the platform is more closed when it hosts less sides and hampers competition by offering 
substitutes to the products and services that one of the sides offers.  
In this section, I elaborate the openness strategies that the case companies used and their 
limitations and how they affect to other strategies used in crowdsourcing goods delivery 
platforms. The case companies both opened their platforms for participation and closed it. 
As the following case study examples will show, openness has a fundamental effect to 
strategies related to pricing and governance strategies. 
Include an additional side. Crowdsourcing goods delivery companies OrangeGrocer, 
GreenGrocer and MaroonFood were able to make their platform more profitable, pay 
their crowds, i.e., deliverers, more and charge the orderers less when they were able to 
include third side, the retailers, onto their platforms. Retailers facilitated also keeping the 
product listings in the platform application up to date by sharing their data. However, 
partnerships also made managing the platform more complex.  
Before the platforms appeared attractive enough for retailers to join and pay for the 
participation they needed to reach a certain threshold in the amount of users. 
OrangeGrocer and GreenGrocer were able to attract retailers only when their markets 
evolved. In the early phases of their life cycle, the platforms hosted only two sides: the 
orderers and the deliverers. In less than a year, GreenGrocer was able to gather sufficient 
amount of users onto their platform to attract retailers. OrangeGrocer, in turn, grew its 
user base for two years before they were able to establish partnerships with grocers. 
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Also MaroonFood had the retailer side, restaurants, on its platform. MaroonFood 
penetrated each new market by establishing partnerships with restaurants before offering 
deliveries to the orderers. Unlike OrangeGrocer and GreenGrocer, MaroonFood did not 
need to build up the base of the deliverers prior to launching in new markets, as the 
company employed them. This case company represents the largest platform in the study 
sample, in terms of sales and presence in different markets, which readily yields a strong 
value proposition to attract the retailer side: a potential sales channel.  
Partnerships between the platforms and retailers increased the formers’ profitability and 
facilitated maintaining the platform. Firstly, the companies were able to leverage the new 
side in their pricing strategies. The commissions that the third side paid for each delivery 
enabled the platforms to offer their orderers lower prices and their deliverers a higher 
remuneration. Once they managed to conduct the partnerships with grocers, 
OrangeGrocer and GreenGrocer’s revenue streams included commissions that their 
partner grocers paid for each item purchased through their platforms. The commissions 
varied between the products. Similarly, restaurants paid commission that was dependent 
on the meal price for each meal purchased through MaroonFood’s platform. I will 
elaborate these strategies more with other pricing strategies in the following section.  
Secondly, the partnerships entailed also shared product information, which facilitated 
maintaining the platforms. As the orderers were able to browse and purchase the products 
straight through the platform, GreenGrocer and OrangeGrocer’s partners were constantly 
updating their product data onto the platforms. This ensured that the ordering customers 
would not purchase items that were out of stock. Similarly, partner restaurants constantly 
shared their menus with MaroonFood so that the platform would stay up to date. 
In turn, also the retailers benefitted from the partnerships. Firstly, a platform with large 
user base naturally offered retailers a new sales channel. Secondly, GreenGrocer 
constantly provided the retailers with information on the stores. For example, retailers 
could improve their store layout based on data concerning the average time the deliverers 
spent in stores picking up items. Moreover, establishing a partnership with a 
crowdsourced grocery deliverer allowed grocers to lower the costs in the unprofitable 
last-mile deliveries. In fact, one of their grocer partners was promoting GreenGrocer’s 
deliveries as a complementary home grocery delivery service for its customers.  
 32 
“[The grocers] are losing money with the logistics because they have to offer a system 
from each store to deliver. Otherwise they have to take the orders like two days before if 
they want have a working system of logistics. If they want to have a niche store the 
logistics of the delivery for the online shopping, they are losing money because they need 
to have some people just for that. They cannot make the offer properly.” –GreenGrocer 
However, partnerships made the case companies’ platforms also more complex. Data 
sharing with external entities caused some difficulties, as some were more hesitant 
updating their data than others. The interviewee in OrangeGrocer mentioned this as one 
of the most challenging quality issues that their platform had faced. Hence, an additional 
side potentially entails unexpected quality issues and increased complexity on the 
platform. I go through all the imposed governance strategies later in the Findings. 
“In terms of maintain quality, our biggest hurdle is making sure that the products that 
they order through our website is available in the store. Because there’s some disconnect 
between shopper data and in store data that we have in our own web sites. It’s because of 
the simple fact that some grocers are more hesitant to share data than others.” – 
OrangeGrocer 
Other case companies in the study did not include an additional side onto their platform 
mainly due to their business model or the lack in volumes. BlueShipper used retailers in 
pilots they ran but they were not part of the BlueShipper’s everyday service. 
AuburnDeliverer already acted as an intermediary between the deliverer and the retailer 
that represented the orderer for the platform. The crowdshipping companies in turn 
mainly settled for two sides because their platforms were relying on a model that was 
solely connecting people that needed something to deliver with those who could carry out 
the task on their way. Further, IndigoDeliverer and PurpleShipper both mentioned having 
had difficulties creating volume and frequency of use onto their platforms. Thus, 
presumably, they failed to reach the threshold of deliveries, which was necessary for 
attracting the third side, retailers, to exploit these platforms in their business. Similarly, 
only grocery delivery platform that had not established partnerships with retailers, 
YellowGrocer, had also had problems with low volumes and particularly providing 
frequent deliveries in some areas. The case company was still in its early phase of 
platform development and the amount of users was still low.  
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Employing deliverers. GreenGrocer and MaroonFood integrated to their deliverer side 
by turning some of the crowds into full-time or part-time employees. Also OrangeGrocer 
was intending to adopt this strategy. The strategy aimed at maintaining high quality of the 
service and especially providing more available and reliable service for the orderers. 
Flexibility, i.e., voluntary choosing of tasks and paying the deliverers on a delivery basis, 
typically allowed crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms to operate profitably even with 
low volumes but also resulted in infrequent and unreliable deliveries. Therefore, hiring 
deliverers required to be supported by a sufficient volume of delivereies, as it traded off 
flexibility for higher availability.  
GreenGrocer aimed at improving availability by hiring some of crowdsourced deliverers 
as employees. The company had decided to employ some of the deliverers because 
flexible working hours, which crowdsourcing model provided for the deliverers, had 
resulted in poor availability of the service. The deliverers were hired to operate full-time 
in the busiest areas in order to match the supply with the high amount of orders. The 
crowdsourced deliverers, which chose the deliveries voluntarily, were operating normally 
and delivered also around the busiest areas. Thus, operating deliveries with own 
employees in parallel with the crowdsourced deliveries, allowed GreenGrocer to provide 
more frequent deliveries while keeping the model still flexible. 
“[Hiring deliverers] was more about the availability of the [deliverers] than a little 
problem. - - Because problem of having this flexible system is that the availability 
becomes a problem we you’ve made it so flexible” – GreenGrocer 
Similarly, the interviewee in the grocery delivery platform OrangeGrocer mentioned that 
high volume would eventually make employing some of the deliverers in an area 
economically the most feasible option. However, the limited volume still required the 
company to use more flexible approach: to have deliverers as independent contractors.  
“The problem that [the company] has with crowdsourced model is that we don’t have 
tremendous volume we can engage our contractors in the full-time level in terms of they 
can rely on [the company] as the primary source of income. - - I think it might be more 
economical to eventually to go down the model of doing it hybrid or maybe even a full 
employee level fleet if you have a volume to support it.”–OrangeGrocer 
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MaroonFood employed all of its deliverers because their model demanded it. 
MaroonFood had been able to expand in multiple markets and grow its brand. In each 
new market, the company fast realized high demand that required high supply. Therefore, 
the company had to be able to provide sufficient amount of meal deliveries to match the 
high demand. Hiring deliverers as part-time employees and allocating them around lunch 
and dinner times was meant to ensure this. Hence, for MaroonFood it was reasonable to 
trade off flexible, voluntary open call for a reliable service.  
Although flexibility yields opportunities for crowdsourced platforms, other companies 
had not considered possibility of employing deliverers to improve availability. Reason for 
not integrating to the deliverer side was mainly an insufficient volume of deliveries. 
Firstly, as mentioned, employing deliverers is economically feasible only if the company 
has volume to support it. Therefore, due to the nature of crowdshipping companies, 
BlueShipper, and PurpleShipper could not employ deliverers and stay profitable. The 
long-distance crowdshipping services provide service to people even in remote locations 
and between long distances, where providing sufficient volume of deliveries would not be 
possible.  
In addition, employing deliverers is not always an attracting option for the platform 
provider. When integrating to the deliverer side, crowdsourcing platforms trade off the 
flexibility, which is the factor that differentiates them from traditional delivery services. 
Firstly, with the flexible crowdsourcing model, where the crowds are paid only for the 
deliveries they carry out, the platforms are able to expand the service into a vast market 
without high upfront cost. Secondly, flexibility also means avoiding risks: the 
crowdsourcing platforms are able to operate profitable even in uncertain environments 
that are prone to fluctuations in demand.  
 “So our business is literally been able to move to other areas without having to really 
incur any costs apart from putting a few adverts out for new drivers. Some of our 
competitors in [the country] which do similar thing but not through crowdsourcing, 
they’re quite slow to expand. It just shows how expensive it is to expand when you’ve got 
fleet of drivers to pay and make sure that you give them constant work.” – YellowGrocer 
Summary. Crowdsourced goods delivery platforms both opened the platform for new 
participant groups and closed it. First, they included an additional side to make the 
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platform more attractive for deliverers and orderers. Retailers became a part of a 
platform, which entailed commissions for delivering their products. Commissions, in 
turn, increased the remuneration of the deliverers, i.e., the crowds, or discounted the price 
for orderers. Thus both were attracted to join the platform in increasing numbers. Second, 
they hired deliverers for improving quality control, closing the deliverers’ side. The 
strategy aimed at providing the customers, the orderers, with more available and reliable 
deliveries. Indeed, infrequent deliveries were a major issue for attracting orderers.  
However, the platforms needed to reach a sufficient amount of users before adopting 
these strategies. Before being able to include retailers that were willing to pay 
commissions, the crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms needed to reach a certain 
threshold amount of users for them to be valuable enough to attract retailers.  Hiring some 
of the deliverers traded off flexibility that allowed platforms to be profitable even with 
low volumes. Hence, this strategy needed also to be supported by a sufficient volume of 
deliveries in an area for these platforms to stay profitable. 
A brief summary of the openness strategies that crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms 
used is shown in the Table 2. 
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Table 2: Strategies the case companies used to alter platform openness 
Case company 
Sides on the 
platform Openness strategies 
OrangeGrocer Orderers - Deliverers 
- Grocers 
• Include a retailer onto the platform 
• (Intention to employ some of the 
deliverers) 
GreenGrocer Orderers - Deliverers 
- Grocers 
• Include a retailer onto the platform 
• Employed some of the deliverers 
YellowGrocer Orderers - Deliverers • Had not altered openness 
BlueShipper Orderers - Deliverers • Retailers were included in some pilots 
the platform ran 
PurpleShipper Orderers - Deliverers • Had not altered openness 
BurgundyDeliverer Orderers - Deliverers • Had not altered openness 
IndigoDeliverer Orderers - Deliverers • Had not altered openness 
AuburnDeliverer Retailers - Deliverers • Had not altered openness 
MaroonFood Orderers - 
Restaurants 
• Employed all the deliverers as part-time 
employees 
  •  
4.2. Pricing strategies 
The pricing strategies aim at realizing network effects and engaging users. They address 
pricing challenges that involve balancing prices in a viable way for all the users groups 
(Hagiu 2014), and also leveraging individuals’ intrinsic motivations (Boudreau & Hagiu 
2008). 
In this section, I first further elaborate the penetration pricing strategy that the 
crowdshipping companies used to obtain the initial user base, the critical mass. Then I 
describe how the rest of the case companies, which determined the prices themselves, 
moved from subsidizing deliverers to subsidizing orderers.  
Penetration pricing to attract the critical mass. The crowdshipping companies aimed 
at attracting the initial mass of users by offering their service without any transaction fees. 
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The early stages of the platform life cycle are challenging for platforms because no side 
will join while the other one is missing. Therefore, the companies maintained the value as 
high as possible for the users by postponing the monetization. The companies did not 
monetize the platform until the number of users had reached a threshold after which the 
opposite sides would have continued attracting one another and the platform would have 
kept on growing by itself.  
In this study, I use the term critical mass to refer to a threshold amount of users that 
entailed viability. In a viable platform, the opposite user sides would attract each other 
making the platform grow by itself. Viability was achieved when the amount of deliverers 
matched the order demand. Thus, the critical mass was not an exact number of users but a 
varying transition point where platform became viable.  
 “For a company to be viable, you have to hit that certain sweet spot for your company to 
make sure that you’re profitable in each city.” – OrangeGrocer 
“- - [The platform] feeds itself. So it grows year and year without us doing anything, 
really, which is what we’re looking for.” – PurpleShipper 
 “As soon as you’ve got a critical mass of orders in a particular area we’re not having to 
[encourage] [deliverers] to scale up and do the delivery.”– YellowGrocer 
“First of all you need to get there enough [deliverers] to cover the population of that 
city- -“ – GreenGrocer 
The crowdshipping platforms, BlueShipper, PurpleShipper, BurgundyDeliverer and 
IndigoDeliverer, could not subsidize a single side because they did not determine the 
prices themselves. All the crowdshipping platforms had incorporated an open pricing 
system where the users determined the delivery prices themselves. The balance of supply 
and demand would define the prices, instead: if supply, i.e., the amount of the deliverers, 
is high and demand, i.e., amount of orderers, is low, even low priced orders are likely to 
get delivered soon and vice versa. Thus, the platforms could hardly influence in prices. 
Therefore, the crowdshipping companies, which deployed open-pricing system, needed to 
attract the necessary initial mass of users with penetration pricing, i.e., by maintaining the 
platform free from transaction fee. In the early phases of their life cycles, the 
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crowdshipping companies attracted both deliverers and orderers onto their platforms by 
offering the service without a transaction fee. Thus, the platforms did not gain any profit 
in exchange for the critical mass, which was crucial in increasing the amount connections 
between users. If the platforms were able to gather the initial user base and realize 
beneficial connections between them, the following positive network effects would result 
in self-feeding platform where increase in amount of users on one side would attract the 
users on the other. However, only IndigoDeliverer from crowdshipping companies had 
introduced a transaction fee. 
The other crowdshipping companies intended to monetize the platform once a sufficient 
user base had been grown and the service had become a functioning, reliable platform. As 
discussed before, the larger the platform the higher the value is for its users. Thus, the 
case companies were to monetize their platforms once the value for users had grown high 
enough for sharing. BurgundyDeliverer and BlueShipper were planning to introduce a 
simple transaction fee of 5 % to 10 %. PurpleShipper, in turn, had various prospect 
monetizing strategies, such as transaction fee, premium insurance and subscriptions. 
 “We don’t take any commission, we don’t charge anything. And we will most probably 
follow this model for a while until we grow our user base and we do all the necessary 
small changes and optimizations.”–BurgundyDeliverer 
“We will turn on the monetization within couple of weeks, I would say. - - We have a 
bunch of different ways of monetizing and we will turn on in different stage the different 
ones. - - There’s a just a percentage fee from sender, it could be a combined sender fee 
and bringer fee, it could be post-subscriptions for professional companies to give them 
value-added services. It could be premium insurance - - Then express notification” – 
PurpleShipper 
From the crowdshipping companies, IndigoDeliverer was the only one to charge a 
transaction fee from the beginning. The fee was used to cover the admin and maintenance 
costs. Being a spin-off of a larger logistics organization, IndigoDeliverer differed 
fundamentally from the rest of the companies that mainly were self-funded start-ups but it 
did not presumably result to any requirement for a higher return on investment than in the 
other case companies. According to the interviewee, IndigoDeliverer failed to realize 
enough volume for it to be interesting for the parent organization and was eventually 
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ceased. However, the relatively low transaction fee was not suspected to be the cause for 
the network failure.  
”We had a small commission, I can’t recall how big it was, to cover the admin and the 
maintenance of the platform. - - Our commission was really low from the beginning. It 
was not in the level to change anyone’s decision. - - The price was set by the end 
receiver. And if it was zero price for him, there was no commission either. I don’t 
[believe] that it would be a deciding factor.” – IndigoDeliverer 
YellowGrocer did not use penetration pricing when entering new markets but adopted a 
similar approach for the least profitable deliveries. The pricing mechanism in 
YellowGrocer was designed in a way that the platform did not turn a profit in the least 
profitable deliveries ensuring a sufficient pay for the deliverer. The delivery fee charged 
from the orderer was not dependent on the distance, contrary to the deliverer’s pay. 
Consequently, in low volume, i.e., low profitability areas the platform would not receive 
any profit making the delivery more valuable for both the orderer and the deliverer. In 
turn, in high volume, i.e., profitable areas, where the distances are short and deliverers are 
able to deliver more at once, there is enough value for the platform to charge a profit.  
 “The drivers [are] paid the fixed amount per delivery - - then we may have to take any 
hits in price differences depending if the products are more expensive. Other things that 
can affect our profit margin would be the distance actually paid. So we pay the driver 
[extra] for going further distances. Again that may just knock us under profitability on 
some of the smaller orders and voucher codes. “ YellowGrocer 
The case companies that determined the prices themselves did not need to use penetration 
pricing. OrangeGrocer and GreenGrocer’s pricing algorithms were established in a way 
that there was a share allocated for the company, too. Naturally, they could have used 
penetration pricing by not taking the share. But these case companies were growing the 
platforms by subsidizing a single side, the deliverers. They covered the cost of 
subsidizing by charging the orderer more or by demanding commission from the retailers. 
Subsidizing the deliverers. In the early stages of their life cycle, GreenGrocer, 
OrangeGrocer, YellowGrocer subsidized the deliverer side that needed to be attracted 
first onto the platform for the orderers to join. Deliverers represented this critical mass for 
these case companies, as they were needed to provide the service in the first place. More 
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deliverers also resulted in more frequent deliveries on the platforms. To cover the cost of 
subsidizing, these case companies charged the profit from the orderer, instead.  
Ensuring sufficient pay for the deliverer or even subsidizing them was necessary in order 
to engage them already from the early stages of a platform life cycle. For the platforms, 
the deliverers represented the critical mass, which was needed to provide sufficient 
amount of deliveries for the ordering customer. If the platform had too few deliverers, the 
deliveries would have been too infrequent to keep the orderers content with the service. 
Therefore, deliverers were needed to provide a reliable and available service, which 
aimed at attracting orderers to use the service. 
For example, GreenGrocer was constantly ensuring that the platform had enough 
deliverers to satisfy the orderers. The company let people to register as deliverers, but not 
deliver, in the areas they were planning to expand, beforehand. Each time prior to 
launching the service in a new area, or a zip code, they first estimated the amount of 
prospect orderers in the new area. Then the company ensured that they had enough pre-
subscribed deliverers there to provide the orderers with reliable delivery service. The 
company executives saw this critical for a functioning platform. 
GreenGrocer: “First of all, you need to get there enough [deliverers] to cover the 
population of that city - - We see how many [deliverers] do we need. So we focus the first 
week on getting those [deliverers]. Since we have the [deliverers] and we also have the 
retailer, we just make a little marketing there and then we open” 
In turn, low amount of deliverers led to a poor availability of the service. YellowGrocer 
used a different approach to launch a service; a zip code was opened when a person 
signed up to deliver in the area. Thus, the platform was not able to provide a reliable 
service just after the launch, as the amount of deliverers did not reach the required critical 
mass.  
YellowGrocer: “- - as soon as one driver then signs up, customer with that post code 
would be offered a delivery service. So it’s just one driver, it’s probably not enough to 
offer a reliable deliver service.” 
To obtain the initial, required amount of deliverers the prices were constructed to 
subsidize and thus attract them. The crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms pricing 
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algorithms were aimed at securing sufficient pay for the crowds, i.e., the deliverers, for 
their contribution. The platforms that displayed products on their service, OrangeGrocer, 
GreenGrocer, YellowGrocer and MaroonFood, were able to charge the end customer 
mark-ups on the products or a delivery fee, or both. Mark-up was a fixed percentage or a 
varying margin based on external factors, such as time and distance, which reflected the 
crowds’ time spent on deliveries. The delivery fee was also based on factors that worked 
as proxies for the deliverer’s time spent. For example, in grocery delivery platforms, 
where the deliverer had to collect the items from the grocers’ shelves themselves, the total 
amount of items in an order is the main proxy for the delivery fee that is charged from the 
customer (only OrangeGrocer and GreenGrocer) and paid to the deliverer. Similarly, 
AuburnDeliverer’s delivery fee was dependent on the area of the delivery, as in some 
areas delivering is more difficult and time consuming than in others.  
The orderers could be charged relatively more in the early stages of the platform’s life 
cycle to cover the cost of subsidizing of deliverers. For example, YellowGrocer was 
aiming to obtain the critical mass of deliverers by strongly subsidizing the deliverers 
while charging the orderers more. The platform integrated a mark-up that they expected 
to affect negatively to the number of orderers but which enabled them to pay higher 
remuneration per delivery. The higher remuneration in turn encouraged delivering and 
signing up as a deliverer. The mark-up and the deliverer remuneration were planned to be 
lowered once the critical mass was obtained and the amount of deliveries had scaled up. 
“So we offer a big mark up. We also pay the [deliverers] more with our particular model. 
So I think that probably affect the number of people that order from our service. - - We 
want to bring prices down for the customers and also pay down for the [deliverers] as 
well. As soon as you’ve got a critical mass of orders in a particular area we’re not 
having to [encourage] [deliverers] to scale up and do the delivery. - - Every time we’ve 
spoken to the [deliverers] they are really happy with the amount they are earning. - - 
That’s sort of how we’ve had to solve one of the problems and we’ve done that by 
[encouraging] [deliverers] by paying them a fair amount of money.” 
In addition to subsidizing deliverers by manipulating prices on the platform, the case 
companies were also investing and aiming their efforts to support the delivery activities. 
This may also be considered as subsidizing, as discussed in the Literature Review. 
OrangeGrocer automatically combined nearby orders together on their platform to 
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support delivering multiple orders at once, which guaranteed higher pay for deliverers – 
and higher profit for the company. GreenGrocer, YellowGrocer and MaroonFood sent the 
orders always first to the nearest deliverers to encourage only the most profitable 
deliveries (in GreenGrocer distributed the deliveries based on other metrics than 
proximity, as well). In PurpleShipper and BurgundyDeliverer’s platforms deliverers were 
first asked their destinations and then they were suggested orders that were located by the 
route and could be delivered without excess effort. PurpleShipper was also following, 
when allowed, platform users’ daily driving habits and suggesting the most suitable 
orders that corresponded to their routes.  
BlueShipper further engaged its deliverers with a game. In one of their pilots, 
BlueShipper organized a motivating game that the deliverers could participate in and that 
was linked to the platform’s delivering activities. Rather than aiming towards more 
efficient deliveries, BlueShipper’s approach rewards and further engages the users with 
non-pecuniary incentives, such as recognition, skill development and sheer fun. Instead of 
increasing the remuneration for the deliverers, BlueShipper tapped into the crowds 
intrinsic motivations to engage them. 
 “The deliverers that took part to the game said that they would not require lot of money 
just for playing a game.”– BlueShipper 
The efforts to support the delivery activities further prove that the crowdsourcing goods 
delivery services were subsidizing the deliverer side to realize network effects in the 
beginning. In effect, the side does not only represent the critical mass but is also a close 
equivalent for a staff which creates the value in the end – which also denotes that the 
investments are expected to eventually have returns.  
Switch to subsidize the orderer. Once the amount of deliverers matched the order 
demand, GreenGrocer, AuburnDeliverer and OrangeGrocer started to subsidize and thus 
attract the customers, i.e., the orderers, in increasing numbers to further grow the 
platform. To cover the costs in subsidizing of the orderers, the platforms lowered the 
deliverers’ remuneration or conducted partnerships with retailers that paid a commission 
for each delivery. 
YellowGrocer, too, was intending to switch to subsidizing the orderer side by lowering 
the deliverer remuneration once they had obtained the critical mass of deliverers. 
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YellowGrocer, established in 2015, was still in the nascent phase and thus still 
subsidizing the deliverer side. However, the company was planning to turn this pricing 
strategy upside down. Once there are enough deliverers on the platform to provide 
frequent deliveries, they do not have to be attracted anymore with compelling 
remunerations. A high number of deliverers might result in excess competition on the 
side, which would lead into fewer orders per deliverer and in fact make the platform less 
attractive for them. Therefore, the deliverer remuneration can be brought down to further 
increase value for the orderer, in turn.  
“We want to bring prices down for the customers and also pay down for the [deliverers] 
as well. As soon as you’ve got a critical mass of orders in a particular area we’re not 
having to [encourage] [deliverers] to scale up and do the delivery.”– YellowGrocer 
AuburnDeliverer had reached the threshold amount of deliverers, which allowed it to 
lower deliverers’ remuneration in order to subsidize orderers, instead. The platform had 
been able to grow its deliverer base up to approximately 200 delivery companies. Such 
quantity on the deliverer side had allowed AuburnDeliverer to subsidize the opposite side, 
the orderers, and offer them deliveries priced lower the general average level in the area. 
Apart from the aforementioned reasons, AuburnDeliverer was able to provide lower than 
normal industry level prices also because it represented supplementary income for the 
deliverers. AuburnDeliverer’s deliverers consisted of existing delivery companies and 
they were not obliged to deliver an order in the platform. However, when idle, they could 
cover some of the sunk, fixed costs related to running a business by delivering these 
additional orders. Thus, AuburnDeliverer was able to tap into unused resources of regular 
delivery companies.  
GreenGrocer and OrangeGrocer covered the cost of subsidizing the orderer by including 
retailers onto the platform, instead. The partnerships entailed more profitable deliveries 
due to commissions and lower costs. The partner grocers paid commission per item 
delivered, which allowed GreenGrocer to display the same prices as in stores, in general. 
GreenGrocer was also able to move some of the advertising costs to the grocers that were 
willing to endorse their service as one way to get the groceries delivered home. The 
partnerships, thus, allowed the platform to lower the delivery fee for the orderer while 
maintaining sufficient pay for the deliverer. 
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However, only the successful platforms, in terms of growth, were able to attract other 
external entities. After opening their service more than in one city and succeeding in 
creating some traffic onto their platforms, OrangeGrocer and GreenGrocer both included 
an additional side on their platforms: grocers. (OrangeGrocer had partnerships with 
grocers but was reluctant to provide further details of the partnership). 
Similarly, MaroonFood’s brand and presence in multiple markets facilitated them 
conducting partnerships with the restaurants. Each time prior to moving to a new market, 
MaroonFood established partnerships with restaurants. Due to the commissions that 
restaurants paid for each delivery, MaroonFood was able to provide consumers with low 
priced deliveries, which had been crucial in the industry. Contrary to OrangeGrocer and 
GreenGrocer, MaroonFood was able to negotiate partnerships with retailer without any 
position in the target market because they had already been able to grow and scale to 
various markets, which showed potential for future sales channel and thus readily 
attracted restaurants. MaroonFood’s case supports the finding that platforms are able to 
attract the retailers to the platform as a money-side when their value has increased with 
scale. 
Similarly, GreenGrocer’s benefits increased after each new partner grocer. GreenGrocer’s 
first large partner grocer was followed by more and more grocers interested in joining the 
platform, which resulted in increase in the value of the platform. This allowed the 
company to negotiate increasingly higher commissions, which in turn increased value for 
the orderers and deliverers. Retrospectively, GreenGrocer was able to leverage a 
participant that yielded a significant value for the platform and consequently attracted 
others to join, too. In GreenGrocer case, incorporation of the high-value participant 
resulted in higher commissions, which in turn led to lower cost for the new subsidy side, 
the orderers. 
GreenGrocer: ”I think the main thing to make it profitable is to partnership with these 
retailers - -Also there are other retailers that want to be inside so they paid more. So it’s 
just the wheel that we are becoming more and more famous so they are just paying you 
more and increasing the commission - -” 
Surprisingly, none of the crowdshipping platforms exploited retailers or businesses as a 
separate entity. There were businesses that requested deliveries but BurgundyDeliverer 
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considered them as normal orderers. PurpleShipper had business users that were able to 
offer crowdsourcing deliveries through PurpleShipper but did not pay any commission for 
them. BlueShipper exploited occasionally retailers in pilots, as discussed before, but they 
were not involved in the platform’s basic functionality on a daily basis.  
Summary. The crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms adopted different pricing 
strategies depending on their business model. The crowdshipping companies relied on an 
open pricing system, where the users determine the delivery prices themselves. Thus, the 
platform providers are not able to subsidize a single side, as they do not determine the 
prices themselves. They had to rely on penetration pricing, i.e. postponing monetization 
of the service, to attract users in the early stages of the platform life cycle. In turn, the 
other crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms that defined the prices themselves were 
able to subsidize a single side. Thus, they were able to correct imbalances on the platform 
by attracting one side more than the other. 
Subsidizing consists of at least two sequential stages that the crowdsourcing goods 
delivery platforms follow. First, in the early phases of the platform growth, the platforms 
subsidized deliverers who were needed to provide a functioning delivery service in the 
first place. The voluntary choice of tasks in crowdsourcing platforms typically demands 
for high number of deliverers before the platforms are able to provide the orderers with 
frequent deliveries, i.e., an available delivery service. In the second stage, when number 
of deliverers had enabled frequent deliveries, the crowdsourcing delivery platforms 
started to subsidize the orderers to attract them in increasing numbers and further grow 
the platform. The cost of subsidizing was covered either by lowering the remuneration of 
the previous subsidy-side, the deliverer, or by including retailers as a new side, if the 
platform had grown enough to attract them.  
The companies did not solely rely on pricing strategies but also used rewarding 
mechanisms and invested in the deliverer side to support more efficient value creation 
process and engage the users. 
A brief summary of the pricing strategies that were used to realize network effects, 
engage crowds and control quality is shown in the Table 3. 
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Table 3: Pricing strategies used by the case companies 
Case company Pricing strategies 
OrangeGrocer • Subsidizes deliverers to gain critical mass  
• Starts subsidizing also the orderer by including a retailer 
GreenGrocer • Subsidizes deliverers to gain critical mass  
• Starts subsidizing also the orderer by including a retailer 
YellowGrocer • Subsidize deliverers to gain critical mass 
• (Planning to switch subsidizing orderer and lower deliverer 
remuneration once critical mass had been obtained) 
BlueShipper • Penetration pricing: No monetary benefits the company in the 
nascent phase in order to attract users 
PurpleShipper • Penetration pricing: No monetary benefits for the company in the 
nascent phase in order to attract users 
BurgundyDeliverer • Penetration pricing: No monetary benefits the company in the 
nascent phase in order to attract users 
IndigoDeliverer • Low transaction fee from the beginning 
AuburnDeliverer • Subsidizes orderers by lowering deliverer remuneration sufficient 
mass had been obtained 
MaroonFood • Subsidizes orderers and deliverers by charging the retailer side 
 
4.3. Regulating access 
Regulating access was one of the governance strategies that were used to control the 
quality on the platform and ensure positive network effects and engagement of the users. 
Contrary to the openness strategies, regulating access addressed only the access of single 
individuals of each user group. Thus, access regulation does not control the number of 
sides.  
In this section, I describe how and why the crowdsourcing goods delivery companies 
regulated access of their crowds. The case companies limited geographical access and 
sorted out the desirable prospect participants from the undesirable ones. 
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Growth through restricted geographical access. Crowdsourcing delivery platforms 
managed their growing by establishing their service in one limited area before moving to 
the next. Restricted geographical access facilitated controlling quality and increased the 
likelihood of relevant connections, due to the users’ proximity. This led to increasing 
amount of relevant connections and positive network effects.  
The case companies deployed varying levels of geographic restriction. OrangeGrocer, 
GreenGrocer, BurgundyDeliverer, IndigoDeliverer, AuburnDeliverer and MaroonFood 
all restricted access in a city or a zip code level mainly to realize network effects in a 
limited area before scaling up. YellowGrocer, in turn, restricted access in a country level. 
BlueShipper, PurpleShipper targeted the service to users that travel abroad and between 
cities, which required them to tap into a large pool of prospect orderers and deliverers. 
The interviewees said that the growth through restricted access was necessary to realize a 
viable platform. 
“For a company to be viable, you have to hit that certain sweet spot for your company to 
make sure that you’re profitable in each city. And also many of these on-demand services 
start with a very niche area of a city and then expand slowly by slowly. So that’s 
regarding the geographic.” – OrangeGrocer 
Growth through restricted access facilitated establishing relevant connections between the 
users, providing frequent deliveries and controlling quality. Firstly, the strategy helped 
the case companies to speed up the increase in the number of relevant connections 
between the deliverers and the orderers, which naturally contributes to platform growth. 
In physical goods deliveries an exchange of goods takes place, which requires the 
deliverer to meet with the orderer. Therefore, the number of relevant connections 
increases when the users on the opposite sides of the platform are located near to each 
other. Hence, the platform does not need a large amount of users in order to be viable in a 
limited area. 
“- - When you don’t have that much supply or that much demand, it’s very difficult for the 
company to do the correct [matching of users]. - - So all platforms, all market places, 
anything that’s crowdsourced, crowdshipped or crowdfunded or whatever needs both 
sides to have a good balance to work well. And for example, in our case, in the case of 
deliveries - - you have to follow a hyper-localized model. Because people want something 
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delivered within a city or need to get some transportation within a city, you have to focus 
on each city one by one. - - We have to again start building the whole thing, building the 
demand and supply and do the [matching of users].”– BurgundyDeliverer 
On the contrary, in long distance deliveries, it is more difficult to establish relevant 
connections. The aim of the BlueShipper and PurpleShipper is to find people who could 
deliverer goods from orderers’ location to the drop-off location on their way. The prices 
on the platform are not high enough to encourage deliverers to do the task without having 
to do the trip anyways. The likelihood of relevant connections is thus much smaller. It is 
unlikely for any deliverers’ long-distance route to match the orderer’s location and the 
drop-off location. Indeed the frequency of use had been a major challenge for 
crowdshipping companies BlueShipper and PurpleShipper that supported the long-
distance deliveries and needed to offer their service countrywide.  
However, to solve this problem, also crowdshipping companies may adopt geographically 
restricted growth. The interviewee in PurpleShipper suggested that targeting the service 
in the busiest routes between the most inhabited cities could have an influence on the rate 
of the deliveries. This adaptation of geographically restricted growth would have 
increased the probability of relevant connections, similarly to city-by-city approach. 
Relevant connections, in turn, would have facilitated increased the frequency of use and 
thus growing the platform. 
”[As an answer to a question about the expansion strategy:] Usually we do it on a market 
by market, country by country. So a lot of other companies - - do city by city. - - But we 
see that doing just that although it might be smart, it kind of limits our market, because 
there’s so many people that needs to send something between cities or longer distances 
and there are also lot of people traveling in those areas. But of course it might have been 
smart to focus on different routes, say for example, [one large city] to [another large 
city].” – PurpleShipper 
Secondly, growing through restricted access helped the crowdsourcing goods delivery 
platforms also to offer more frequent deliveries. Limiting ordering only to certain areas 
facilitated gathering the critical mass of deliverers, which would guarantee available 
service. For example, grocery delivery platform GreenGrocer ensured that they had 
enough pre-signed-up deliverers in a zip code to cover the estimated amount of prospect 
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orderers in the area prior to launching the service there. Similarly, interviewee in 
AuburnDeliverer mentioned that they could not expand their service into other cities 
before they had gathered a sufficient amount of deliverers into that area. An available and 
reliable service was necessary in order to be able to provide enough value for the orderers 
on to the platform. Indeed, BurgundyDeliverer had found the orderers being demanding 
concerning the reliability of the service. 
 “[Comparing the orderers to the deliverers:] - - the [orderer] has more demands, needs 
the service more urgently and will not excuse us many mistakes if you do any.”– 
BurgundyDeliverer 
In YellowGrocer’s platform the deliverers’ locations determined where the service was 
available. YellowGrocer was available for deliverers to join within the country, and once 
a user signed up as a deliverer, the service would be offered for the orderers in the 
respective area or zip code. With this approach the platform was able to expand 
geographically quickly and with low cost and tap into a large crowd of potential 
deliverers. However, they were not able to provide a reliable service everywhere, in terms 
of availability, due to the lack of deliverers. For example, if there were only one deliverer 
in the area, the service would still be offered to the ordering customers resulting in a 
potentially unreliable service. 
“I think the advantage is that we’ve built to expand quite quickly across the whole 
country. So our business is literally been able to move to other areas without having to 
really incur any costs apart from putting a few adverts out for new drivers. - - As soon as 
one driver then signs up, customer with that postcode would be offered a delivery service. 
So it’s just one driver, it’s probably not enough to offer a reliable deliver service. - - If a 
customer orders in one small area but we don’t have any deliver drivers then you get 
quite disappointed customer.”– YellowGrocer 
Lastly, growth through restricted access was necessary for controlling the delivery 
distance which quality was highly dependent of. Grocery and food delivery platforms, 
OrangeGrocer, GreenGrocer and MaroonFood needed to strictly control the distances 
between a store or a restaurant and the orderer due to the perishable nature of food. 
Therefore, these platforms permitted only orders in the same zip code where the 
restaurant or the grocer was located.  
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“We plan the delivery areas so that our deliverers would spend more than 15 minutes 
driving to from restaurant to the orderer.” –MaroonFood 
However, regulating geographical access cannot be concluded to be a decisive factor for 
growth. First, tapping into an existing, high-volume product segment, such as groceries or 
restaurant food, which people consume on a daily basis, is expected to have an effect on 
the frequency of deliveries and thus growth. In crowdshipping platforms, the users’ need 
for a delivery was much more infrequent. This resulted in problems with frequency and 
long tail of idle users.  
“[As an answer to obstacles in crowdsourcing:] --Then of course, the frequency use case. 
It’s an obstacle because when you start a service like that, unless you get into for example 
directly in food delivery where frequency is abundant. - - And how often you have a 
delivery need? Most people don’t need delivery need every week. You have it three times 
a year, maybe. And then it doesn’t really become much.” – PurpleShipper 
Second, any service fails if it cannot deliver enough value for the end customers. After 
failing to realize sufficient volume on the platform, local goods delivery platform 
IndigoDeliverer decided to cease their service, although being restricted to a relatively 
populous city. The interviewee of IndigoDeliverer claimed, however, that the concept 
failed to create enough value for the target customer and the deliverer: the service 
allowed the orderer to get his package delivered from a nearby (maximum one kilometre 
according to the interviewee) delivery point, where online orders were shipped, by 
anyone subscribed as a deliverer. Thus, the deliveries were, presumably, infrequent due to 
the nature of the service – the value, in brief, was to get infrequent online orders delivered 
from a nearby location. 
”I think the core problem is that the [platform] solution did not offer enough value for the 
end receiver. - - We put lot of effort into extracting [deliverers] with reasonable success I 
would say. But in the end there were very few parcels that were posted on the [platform] 
app for the delivery.” – IndigoDeliverer 
Control entry to improve fit of the participants. The crowdsourcing delivery platforms 
increased the likelihood of relevant connections and decreased the likelihood of negative 
ones by controlling the participant entry process. Confirming deliverers’ identities, 
organizing training and orientation and limiting deliverers only to existing delivery firms 
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or own employees were practices used to control deliverer access to secure a high quality 
of the delivery service. After the vetting and training process, the rating system ensured 
that the deliverers were held under a constant surveillance. A different control was 
applied to retailer side: the case companies involving the retailer side simply had 
guidelines for selecting partners that were of benefit for their business. Apart from the 
geographical restrictions, the orderer access was regulated only with social filters. 
The main mechanisms to control the deliverer access were the background checks, the 
social filters and the bank verification. BurgundyDeliverer and OrangeGrocer vetted 
deliverers with thorough background checks and BlueShipper required users to register 
through bank verification. PurpleShipper, GreenGrocer and BurgundyDeliverer verified 
identity with social filters, such as Facebook account, and other information, such as 
credit card information also to ensure that the platform users involved only real people. 
Registering in IndigoDeliverer and YellowGrocer did not involve any vetting process. 
AuburnDeliverer chose only existing delivery companies to make deals with and 
MaroonFood’s access regulation could be considered the strictest as it only used its own 
employees.  
These mechanisms were less strict in the crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms that 
still had a low volume of deliveries. Entry regulation was perceived unbeneficial for the 
platform especially in the early phase of the life cycle when growth in users is crucial, as 
restricting access potentially hinders the increase in amount of users. Further, when 
volumes are low, quality issues occur less likely, so entry regulation was perceived 
unnecessary in the beginning. Thus, the reason for loose regulation in the user entry in 
nascent platforms can be interpreted to be a goal to support fast growth. 
“So usually when the platform is small, it reduces the friction to gain more traction. And 
as it scales, it brings more friction.” – BurgundyDeliverer  
“[As an answer to the question about potential quality issues:] That was not a concern. 
We never realized that in reality. I think we didn’t get enough volume to understand what 
quality issues we had or to realize. Like the real quality, operational quality issues. If you 
take quality for operational quality, we did not get enough volume to catch that.” – 
IndigoDeliverer 
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In three of the case companies, OrangeGrocer, GreenGrocer and MaroonFood, the vetting 
process was followed by deliverer training, which further ensured the fit of the 
participants. This phase is presumably challenging to carry out efficiently, if the number 
of applicants is high or amount of deliverers needs to be increased quickly. However, 
grocery delivery platforms OrangeGrocer and GreenGrocer deemed this phase crucial for 
maintaining the quality of the grocery deliveries. OrangeGrocer required first delivery 
applicants to pass an online training and, after, gave them guidelines for shopping, 
picking up items and communicating with the orderer. Similarly, GreenGrocer provided 
their deliverers with training and guidelines for shopping and delivering.   
“- - You’re dealing with people’s groceries and this is what people consume on a regular 
basis. So, yes, they’re [going to] be very careful about where they order from. So we have 
one chance. And if they are trusting a new brand they have never seen before they might 
be hesitant. So it starts from recruiting. We tell our [deliverers] to shop as if you were 
shopping for your own family. We create them guideline on how to shop certain fruits and 
vegetables and so forth, how to proceed in terms of making sure that a product is out of 
stock, how do communicate with the customer and stuff like that.” – OrangeGrocer 
Perhaps the most popular regulation mechanism for crowdsourcing platforms was a rating 
system, which was maintained by the participants. Although the system did not weed out 
the undesirable participants prior to access, it prevented negative interactions from 
recurring. GreenGrocer, PurpleShipper, BurgundyDeliverer and IndigoDeliverer allowed 
orderers to rate and evaluate the deliverer, and YellowGrocer was intending to introduce 
this feature. OrangeGrocer did not deploy rating system but instead encouraged users to 
give feedback on their operations and their deliverers. In addition, GreenGrocer and 
IndigoDeliverer enabled the rating and evaluation another way round, too. In 
GreenGrocer, the ratings on orderers were not public.  
The rating systems were used for the same purpose, albeit differently. In PurpleShipper, 
BurgundyDeliverer and IndigoDeliverer the orderer could choose the deliverer based on 
the ratings among other factors. In GreenGrocer, the rating was one of the factors that 
affected the automatic distribution of tasks to deliverers. Furthermore, GreenGrocer 
contacted the deliverers who had been rated poorly and were not following the platform 
guidelines. Although not using a rating system at the time, YellowGrocer monitored 
quality by following the user feedback and similarly expelling the deliverers that violated 
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the rules of the platform. Nevertheless, the goal was the same: limiting deliveries of the 
deliverers who had performed poorly and preferring those whose behaviour was 
exemplary.  
BlueShipper, AuburnDeliverer and MaroonFood did not have a rating system for their 
deliverers. Naturally, as an employer, MaroonFood could not exploit ratings to limit its 
employees from working. AuburnDeliverer, in turn, was acting as an intermediary and the 
end customer did not have an access to the platform. Thus, the rating system was not 
applicable.  
The platforms that involved the retailer side did not have extra measures for controlling 
the retailers’ access because the volume on the side was relatively small compared to the 
orderer and deliverer side. Instead, companies established partnerships with companies 
that were interested in joining the platform and were suitable in terms of the service’s 
focus and requirements. MaroonFood established partnerships only with restaurants that 
suited its offering – e.g., by keeping the pizzerias out. OrangeGrocer and GreenGrocer 
were in the phase of proceeding slowly with partnerships and each deal was separately 
negotiated with different terms with each grocer. AuburnDeliverer was limiting retailers 
only into the area where they had sufficient amount of deliverers in order for the service 
to be liable.  
Orderers’ access, in turn, was merely restricted. Platforms limited the access with social 
filters but mainly the customer access was maintained loose, apart from the geographical 
restrictions. For example, BurgundyDeliverer let users to join only with their Facebook 
accounts in order to ensure that the people behind the accounts were real.  
Summary. The case companies regulated access in two different ways: restricting 
geographical access and imposing vetting and training processes for the prospect 
deliverers. The former strategy was adopted to create a viable platform in one market 
prior to moving to another. Limited area increased the likelihood of relevant connections 
between the users due to their proximity, which made restricting geographical access 
beneficial. The latter was used simply to weed out the undesirable deliverers and improve 
the fit of the rest in order to maintain high quality of the deliveries. 
A brief summary of how the case companies regulated access to realize network effects, 
engage users and control quality is shown in the Table 4. 
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Table 4: Regulating access 
Case company Strategies to regulate access 
OrangeGrocer • Growth through a restricted geographical access 
• Control entry: identity check and training 
GreenGrocer • Growth through restricted geographical access 
• Control entry: identity check, training and rating system 
YellowGrocer • (Intention: Control entry: identity check, rating system) 
BlueShipper • Control entry: identity check 
PurpleShipper • Control entry: rating system 
BurgundyDeliverer • Growth through restricted geographical access 
• Control entry: identity check, rating system 
IndigoDeliverer • Control entry: rating system 
AuburnDeliverer • Growth through restricted geographical access 
• Control entry: restrict access only to existing delivery companies 
MaroonFood • Growth through restricted geographical access 
• Control entry: restrict access only to employees 
 
4.4. Regulate interactions 
The second governance strategy, regulating interactions, involves controlling and 
restricting interactions between and within the entities on the platform (Hagiu 2014). By 
regulating access, platforms aim to achieve desired behavior in platform participants and 
in the interactions between them in order to control quality and realize positive network 
effects (Boudreau & Hagiu 2008). 
In this section, I go through the strategies the case companies used to regulate interactions 
between the sides on their platform. Strategies included supporting open communication, 
regulating communication to support creation and consumption and controlling coupling 
process. 
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Support open communication. The crowdshipping platforms, where users were able to 
get anything delivered, believed an open communication to solve majority of the 
problems that the users would encounter. They also supported open pricing that allowed 
the users to determine the prices themselves. Hence, the crowdshipping platforms 
encouraged open communication to relieve themselves from participating in platform 
activities. 
BlueShipper, PurpleShipper, BurgundyDeliverer and IndigoDeliverer sought to secure 
positive interactions between the deliverer and the orderer by enabling open 
communication within the platform. Open communication was supported in the form of a 
chat or a call to allow the users to talk openly to each other. Enabling communication was 
not only a mean to connect users and realize network effects but also to solve problems, 
such as optimization of time windows and unreliability. The users were able to agree on 
the delivery times, provide further information about the items delivered and the 
destination and contact each other when they encountered difficulties. For example, by 
allowing the users to call each other prior to, during and after deliveries through the 
platform application, BurgundyDeliverer outsourced problem solving, time window 
scheduling and informing to its users. Solving these issues would have otherwise required 
developing features onto the platform technology.  
“It’s two things we do: it’s matching and finding people and as soon as they’ve found 
each other letting them communicate and figure out the delivery. That’s kind of the two 
core things that we need to solve for people. [Because] people need to speak.”  – 
PurpleShipper 
The interviewee in BurgundyDeliverer mentioned interactions as the most important 
factor for building a viable platform. Positive interactions, in turn, were secured by 
supporting communication between the users on the platform. 
”So the most important thing for [our service] and for any platform is interactions. It’s 
not a feature, it’s not a resource, but it’s actually what drives and multiplies 
[interactions] of any two-sided platform that connects people. - - You can’t beat the 
communication between the two sides. The most advanced technology may not be 
possible to solve the problem as efficiently as just the two sides calling to each other or 
texting to each other or chatting or you know chat system.” – BurgundyDeliverer 
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The crowdshipping companies, BlueShipper, PurpleShipper, BurgundyDeliverer and 
IndigoDeliverer enabled open communication between the users in the form of a chat or a 
call. They did not even have measures to restrict the goods possible to be delivered on the 
platform (except for light monitoring over illegal deliveries). These services represented 
the least restricted crowdsourcing services of the sample in terms of interactions and 
access. All of these mainly operated with two sides, orderers and deliverers and their goal 
was solely to connect individuals that needed something delivered with those who would 
be able to provide their help.  
Regulate communication to support creation and consumption. OrangeGrocer, 
GreenGrocer, YellowGrocer and MaroonFood were able to support creation of the 
deliverer and the consumption of the orderer by deploying features that automated some 
of the processes.  Essentially, the features restricted the variety of interactions, made 
further communication less necessary and made the activities more efficient.   
The platforms that focused on a specific category of products that people consumed on a 
daily basis seemed to impose more control on communication and interactions on the 
platform. Instead of supporting open communication, they deployed features that limited 
interactions but supported creation processes and consumption. Firstly, the grocery and 
restaurant delivery services, OrangeGrocer, GreenGrocer, YellowGrocer and 
MaroonFood, displayed lists of products on their platforms in order to facilitate buying 
and prevent misunderstandings. Naturally, this measure also controlled the variety of 
goods that the users were able to order and deliver through the platform. Secondly, 
payments were fixed and transacted automatically over the platform to reduce complexity 
and facilitate the purchase. Moreover, GreenGrocer, YellowGrocer and MaroonFood 
distributed the deliveries straight to the deliverer instead of allowing the orderer to choose 
the deliverer or the deliverer to choose the order. Hence, contrary to the crowdshipping 
companies, these platforms controlled and took part into the creation process themselves, 
which prevented negative interactions from occurring.  
Also these case companies enabled open communication but only to an extent that was 
necessary for preventing negative interactions from occurring. OrangeGrocer guided 
deliverers to contact the orderer in the case of failing to deliver to a time slot and reply 
back with their available times, which was aimed at reducing customer disappointment. 
GreenGrocer allowed orderers to leave notes for further instructions so that the deliverer 
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would pick up the correct items, e.g., ripe avocados. AuburnDeliverer and MaroonFood, 
in turn, did not support any communication between the sides. However, both of these 
case companies represent the non-crowdsourcing example in the case sample: 
MaroonFood owned its own employees and AuburnDeliverer exploited businesses in 
their base of deliverers, which facilitated controlling quality. 
It could be interpreted that controlling interactions was more crucial for some platforms 
than for others. Especially the grocery delivery platforms needed to control two separate 
phases in creation: the picking and delivering process. The previous was perceived 
complex for the quality control. Thus, these platforms needed to develop features that 
would support and facilitate both picking and ordering of items on the platform by 
displaying lists of groceries for orderers, among other features. Accordingly, both 
interviewees in crowdshipping platforms, BurgundyDeliverer and PurpleShipper 
mentioned that their users had delivered groceries but admitted that the platforms were 
not fit for the purpose as such because their platform design supported neither the picking 
of items nor selecting of items. 
Control the coupling process. GreenGrocer, YellowGrocer, MaroonFood, 
PurpleShipper and BurgundyDeliverer aimed at making crowdsourcing of deliveries more 
efficient with an improved coupling process. Random coupling of the deliverer and the 
tasks resulted otherwise in long distances and slow deliveries. Instead of allowing the 
orderer to choose the deliverer or the deliverer voluntarily to choose the order, each 
delivery was assigned to the most suitable deliverer. By controlling the coupling process 
the platforms the platforms restricted the interactions between orderers and deliverer but 
were able to offer more reliable deliveries and faster responses.  
These crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms distributed deliveries either automatically 
or manually to the crowds based on distance and ratings on previous deliveries. Both 
GreenGrocer and YellowGrocer deployed algorithms that automatically distributed an 
order to a deliverer once it was uploaded into the system by the orderer. The way the 
algorithm chose the deliverer varied between the two; both platforms took the distance to 
the orderer into account but GreenGrocer additionally applied the deliverer rating, which 
previous orderers had given to the deliverer, into the calculation. In MaroonFood, the 
restaurant orders that were ready for picking up were directed manually to an available 
deliverer closest to the restaurant.  
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The platforms were able to manage quality and efficiency by distributing the orders to the 
most suitable deliverers. Firstly, using the rating system to guide the order distribution 
helped weeding out poor quality drivers. This strategy contributed to higher quality. 
Unlike other platforms that deployed the rating system, GreenGrocer automated the 
decision process not allowing the orderers choose the deliverer based on the ratings.  
Secondly, the order distribution aimed also at improving quality in terms of reliability and 
speed. Distributing orders to the deliverers closest to the orderers shortened the distance, 
which increased the rate of deliveries. Automatizing the process, in turn, ensured that the 
next deliverer was chosen quickly, if the first one denied, which further improved the 
total lead-time. 
In both GreenGrocer and YellowGrocer, the assignment was, however, still voluntary and 
the deliverer could deny the task. In the case of denial, the algorithm would choose 
another suitable deliverer. The latter platform did not enforce any penalty on denying an 
order. In GreenGrocer, the deliverers chose beforehand the one-hour time slots when they 
would be available for deliveries. Then if they denied any order in the one-hour time 
frame, they wouldn’t receive any more orders in that time slot. GreenGrocer’s approach 
is, thus, closer to the MaroonFood’s employee model, where the part-time deliverers 
where allocated beforehand into time slots.  
The need for an improved coupling process was dependent on the product category a 
platform focused in. The grocery and food delivery platforms, GreenGrocer, 
YellowGrocer and MaroonFood, were the only ones to distribute the orders instead of 
allowing the users to do the choice. Indeed, in delivering perishable produces, frozen food 
and hot restaurant food time is a crucial factor, which presumably required these players 
to adopt a fast delivery system. Moreover, both groceries and restaurant food are 
commodities consumed in daily basis, which further necessitates a service with short lead 
times. Due to the nature of the deliveries in the crowdshipping platforms, crowdshipping 
companies were not able to benefit from as high existing volumes as grocery and food 
deliver platforms, which tapped into existing high-volume commodity product segment. 
Hence, orders could be on the platform for a longer period of time. For instance, in 
PurpleShipper the lead-time was often up to a week. 
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However, also crowdshipping companies aimed at improving the coupling process to an 
extent. As mentioned earlier, BurgundyDeliverer suggested orders for the deliverers but 
only after the user had announced his route. PurpleShipper, in turn, followed its users and 
suggested deliveries that were located on the route they frequented the most. This way 
PurpleShipper was able to exploit the long tail of the users – and supposedly shorten the 
lead-times of deliveries. 
“And that’s very satisfying for us to see that the long-tail of users where you might think 
that people are not active but they are. They are just waiting for the right thing.” – 
PurpleShipper 
Even though mainly focused on same-day deliveries, AuburnDeliverer did not deploy an 
automatic or manual order distribution system. Instead, the company simply uploaded 
pending orders onto the platform, where any of their multiple delivery partners could 
reserve and deliver it. However, AuburnDeliverer’s situation was different from the 
OrangeGrocer, GreenGrocer, YellowGrocer and MaroonFood’s. As the company offered 
deliveries to a large base of delivery businesses as a supplementary work to cover the 
costly idle time with, the deliverers were likely to deny an order. Interviewee mentioned 
the availability of their delivery partners as the greatest challenge in the model.  
”One of the main problem is sometimes is that they already have their days planned so 
we can’t really force them to do our deliveries if already have their planning booked. So 
sometimes it’s really hard to [get them to deliver].”– AuburnDeliverer 
Therefore, the time that would have taken a delivery to be accepted after multiple denials 
would have been longer than one of the many deliverers accepting a pending order. Thus, 
it was reasonable for AuburnDeliverer to propose deliveries via voluntary open call, 
which, in effect, is typical of crowdsourcing platforms. 
Summary. Regulating of interactions was aimed at facilitating consumption and creation 
on the platform. Crowdshipping companies, which had relatively infrequent deliveries, 
supported open communication between the participants who then could agree on 
delivery schedules and locations and solve arising problems by themselves. In turn, the 
case companies that had been able to realize more frequent deliveries, imposed more 
control on the communication by developing features that supported more efficient 
consuming, i.e. buying products, and creation, picking and delivering. Crowdsourcing 
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goods delivery platforms regulated interactions also by controlling the coupling of tasks 
and the crowds in order to ensure the quality and efficiency of the deliveries. 
A brief summary of how case companies regulated interactions between the sides to 
realize network effects, engage users and control quality is shown in the Table 5. 
Table 5: Regulating interactions 
Case company Measures to regulate interactions 
OrangeGrocer • Regulate communication to support creation and consumption 
GreenGrocer • Regulate communication to support creation and consumption  
• Control the coupling process 
YellowGrocer • Regulate communication to support creation and consumption  
• Control the coupling process 
BlueShipper • Support open communication 
PurpleShipper • Support open communication 
• Control the coupling process 
BurgundyDeliverer • Support open communication 
• Control the coupling process 
IndigoDeliverer • Support open communication 
AuburnDeliverer • Restrict communication totally between the sides 
MaroonFood • Regulate communication to support creation and consumption  
• Control the coupling process 
 
4.5. Control creation 
Controlling creation was one of the governance strategies the companies adopted to 
achieve improved quality on the platform. Creation refers here to the crowds’ value 
creation processes. In the crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms creation consists of 
activities related to picking and delivering the customer orders. The case companies 
controlled their crowds’ creation by isolating picking as its own isolated process. This 
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strategy further increased the rate of the deliveries and made the delivery process more 
manageable.  
Divide crowds functionally. GreenGrocer and BlueShipper divided crowds functionally 
into different parts of the value chain to control the crowds’ creation process. They 
divided the picking of items and delivering into their own isolated processes. The strategy 
was aimed at accelerating the rate of deliveries in the high-volume areas. The stores that 
faced high demand got their own picking units, which were able to perform picking more 
efficiently. Further, the strategy facilitated controlling the quality, as the parts of the value 
chain were separated and working across the parts was disabled. However, for dividing 
crowds functionally the process had to be sequential, i.e., involving two or more phases, 
such as delivering and picking. Also high volume of deliveries in the area was required in 
order to maintain the platform economically viable. 
These case companies separated the picking phase as its own isolated process either for 
chosen individuals or for the retailer handle. In GreenGrocer, one individual was trained 
for picking items in one store. She was assigned to pick the items ready for the crowds 
who would only deliver the orders to the orderers. Thus, GreenGrocer divided the 
creators functionally into the different parts of the value chain and restricted working 
across the different parts. This approach allowed GreenGrocer to apply more control into 
the picking phase, which was considered crucial for quality, and increase the rate of 
deliveries, as a separate picking unit made the picking process more efficient. 
In BlueShipper’s grocery deliveries, in turn, the retailer would pick up the items. 
Although mainly focused on shipping regular goods, on BlueShipper’s platform the users 
delivered also groceries but they only picked up complete shopping bags with the 
orderer’s purchases from a store. The grocer was in charge of organizing the picking 
phase, instead. Hence, BlueShipper had decided to move the responsibility and quality 
control away from the platform by denying the access into the most critical part of the 
value chain, which picking represented for grocery delivery services.  
However, dividing crowds functionally required sufficient volume to support it. If the 
volumes decreased, the creators in the picking unit would have been left idle. The volume 
of orders needed to support constant picking in a store for the model to make 
economically sense and attract the creators who were responsible for picking.  
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Similarly to GreenGrocer, OrangeGrocer was planning to divide creation process into 
delivery and picking phases. However, the division would take place once the volume of 
deliveries reached a threshold where separating the picking and delivering process would 
make the respective processes more efficient. The company’s deliverers were, thus, still 
in charge of both the picking and the delivering, which was the more viable model when 
the volume was limited and uncertain.  
“When you have volume you can maybe change your model from crowdsourced into 
more hybrid crowdsourced or as full-time basis. What you can do is, you can break the 
fulfillment into two pieces. - - You can have your fleet broken into two components. One 
component can be the picking side and second one can be the actual delivery side [doing 
the last-mile fulfillment]. - - I think it might be more economical to eventually to go down 
the model of doing it hybrid or maybe even a full employee level fleet if you have a 
volume to support it.” – OrangeGrocer 
None of the other case companies divided their creators functionally. Reasons were 
threefold. Firstly, most of the companies were initially strictly focused only on the last-
mile delivery whereas grocery delivery services’ value chain consisted of two distinct, 
sequential parts: picking and the last-mile delivery. For instance, a fundamental design 
decision for MaroonFood’s business model was only to deliver ready-made restaurant 
food instead of including producing and cooking into the company or crowd’s activities.  
Secondly, only high volume enabled dividing crowds into the different parts of value 
chain. Although both OrangeGrocer and YellowGrocer had two clear sequential parts in 
their value chain, picking and delivering, they did not divide their crowds functionally 
because they did not have the volume to support either of the phases as an independent 
process, as described above. GreenGrocer had isolated the picking process only in the 
most frequented store in order to fulfil the orders faster.  
Moreover, only grocery delivery services perceived the picking phase crucial for quality 
and, consequently, customer retention. Picking up the right groceries was important for 
quality, as delivering rotten or otherwise bad quality products would disappoint the 
orderer. From the case study sample, only GreenGrocer had separated picking as isolated 
process that they controlled and OrangeGrocer had considered it. In BlueShipper’s 
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platform, the retailer was responsible of the picking phase only when groceries were 
ordered.  
“You’re dealing with people’s groceries and this is what people consume on a regular 
basis. So, yes, they’re [going to] be very careful about where they order from. So we have 
one chance.” – OrangeGrocer 
Summary. Two of the case companies controlled crowds’ creation by allocating 
individuals separately to either pick the groceries or to deliver them. Working across the 
two separated phases was restricted. The strategy allowed the case companies to increase 
the rate of the deliveries and control quality more efficiently.  
A brief summary of how case companies controlled creation of the crowds to realize 
network effects, engage users and control quality is shown in the Table 6. 
Table 6: Strategies to control crowds’ creation 
Case company Controlling creation 
OrangeGrocer • (Intention: divide crowds functionally) 
GreenGrocer • Divide crowds functionally 
YellowGrocer • Does not control creation 
BlueShipper • Divide crowds functionally (for grocery deliveries only) 
PurpleShipper • Does not control creation 
BurgundyDeliverer • Does not control creation 
IndigoDeliverer • Does not control creation 
AuburnDeliverer • Does not control creation 
MaroonFood • Does not control creation 
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5. Discussion 
This chapter first summarizes the results of the whole study. Second, I discuss the 
contributions to theory on crowdsourcing and MSPs and practical implications for 
management of incumbent organizations and new players in the field. Finally, I evaluate 
the robustness of the study and suggest possible topics for future research. 
5.1. Summary of the key findings 
Crowdsourcing of deliveries presents an opportunity for platform owners to provide 
companies with cost efficient last-mile deliveries and added value for their end 
customers. However, due to the novelty of the industry, prior empirical research 
addressing lately emerged crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms is limited. The wide 
body of crowdsourcing literature had been mainly focusing on open source software 
project and crowdsourced problem solving, innovation and product design competitions 
and on other product development projects exploiting crowds. However, crowdsourcing 
in service applications, where inevitable interactions and goods exchange between the 
creator and the customer set certain restrictions on the practical implementation of the 
service, is less explored and theorized.  
Moreover, the case companies explored in this study were not characterized only by their 
use of crowds but by their multi-sided markets. It is not yet fully understood how the 
common strategies typical of multi-sided markets, i.e., openness, pricing and governance 
strategies, apply to crowdsourcing platforms and, on the other hand, how strategies to 
engage crowds are shaped by multiple sides. Thus, the following research questions were 
formed.  
Q1. How do crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms engage their deliverers, realize 
network effects and control quality in multi-sided markets? 
Q2. How do the platform strategies change throughout the life cycle of a crowdsourcing 
goods delivery platform? 
This qualitative multiple-case study aims at answering the two research questions by 
exploring strategies used in nine crowdsourcing goods delivery companies in multi-sided 
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markets. The case companies realized and maintained positive network effects, which are 
crucial for multi-sided markets, engaged crowds, who in the domain of deliveries were 
the deliverers, and maintained quality of co-created services in an adequate level with 
various pricing strategies and strategies that regulated openness, access, crowds’ creation 
and interactions between the participant groups on platforms. The use of these strategies 
were presented and discussed in detail in Findings in sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5, 
respectively. 
The case study discovered the antecedents of the various strategic choices by inspecting 
the reasoning of the case companies behind each. The strategies were not only affected by 
the business model that the case companies had initially chosen but by the scale of the 
platform. The analysis showed how these strategies were used sequentially throughout the 
different phases of the life cycle of a platform. In the early stages of the life cycle, the 
strategies were aimed at gathering a critical mass of users to ensure reliable deliveries and 
building up a functional platform from the beginning. Once the amount of deliverers 
matched the order demand, the money side shifted from the orderer to the deliverer side 
or possibly to the retailer side, if the platform was able to persuade them to join as a new 
side. The case companies that used open pricing system were to monetize the platform 
only after gathering sufficient amount of users and realizing viable interactions between 
them. After the platforms had gained sufficient amount of users to realize strong network 
effects, they also imposed access and interactions regulation mechanisms and integrated 
to the deliverer side in order to control quality more efficiently.  
Next, I discuss the practical and theoretical implications of the findings. 
5.2. Implications of the study 
This study has contributions to the research of crowdsourcing platforms. Firstly, I 
synthesized a large body of literature to build a comprehensive analytical framework that 
enables structural analysis of crowdsourcing platforms that operate in multi-sided 
markets. The framework provides a base for further research on emerging service-
oriented applications in the crowdsourcing platforms where multiple sides might take 
place and where creators and consumers are overlapping entities. The framework is 
presented in the Literature Review section. These contributions will help future research 
on crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms, in particular.  
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Secondly, the thesis filled the research gap by revealing strategies used in crowdsourcing 
goods delivery platforms in multi-sided markets by using the aforementioned framework. 
These strategies are discussed in detail in the Findings section. Even the real-life 
applications of crowdsourcing goods deliveries are still new and explorative empirical 
studies on the subject are very few. Hence, this study sheds light on the topic among the 
first ones.  
Moreover, this study yields practical implications for the management. Managerial 
implications are important both for incumbent organizations who are considering 
integrating a crowdsourcing model as part of their activities and for emerging players in 
crowdsourcing industry. As implications are different for the management of incumbent 
organizations than for the new players, the strategies are discussed taking the maturity of 
markets into account in the Findings.  
Next, I further discuss the theoretical and practical contributions to platform strategies in 
crowdsourcing goods delivery companies that operate in multi-sided markets. The 
crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms combined strategies typical of crowdsourcing 
and MSPs. However, this study revealed also new strategies that were adopted to make 
the platform viable. The findings also show the strong influence of scale on strategic 
choices on platforms that previous empirical research neglects.  
The altering nature of pricing 
This study shows how pricing strategies are changed throughout the stages of a platform’s 
life cycle. The crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms did not hold to initial pricing 
decisions but varied them, instead. This study also reveals an interconnection between 
openness and pricing. 
The analysis shows that platforms change subsidy sides and money sides when pursuing 
different strategic goals. Prior literature recognizes that on MSPs the platform provider 
may need to subsidize a single side’s users that hold great value for the other sides in 
order to make the platform grow. However, prior research fails to recognize that subsidy-
side and money-side may change over time. This study shows how crowdsourcing goods 
delivery platforms moved from subsidizing deliverers to subsidize the ordering 
customers, instead. This change took place when the amount of deliverers was enough to 
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match the order demand. The platforms started to subsidize the orderer side to attract 
them in increasing number and thus further grow the platform.  
Further, opening a platform for new participant group enabled engaging the original user 
groups. Although openness strategies are discussed in MSP literature, this study shows 
how openness brings a new dimension to consider in pricing of crowdsourcing goods 
delivery platforms. For example, by opening the platform for retailers to participate, the 
crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms were able to subsidize the orderer side, while 
still maintaining remuneration high for the deliverer.  
Combined environment of crowdsourcing and MSP 
The case companies combined strategies that are typical of MSPs and crowdsourcing 
environments. Many of the identified strategies were described either in the literature 
related to MSPs or to crowdsourcing. The interviewees emphasized consistently strategies 
from the both domains as crucial for viability. These strategies were used to complement 
each other. Therefore, as hypothesized in the Literature Review section, it is important to 
consider crowdsourcing platforms operating in multi-sided markets. 
There were two strategies that were identified from prior crowdsourcing literature. First, 
controlling coupling process is a common mean to improve efficiency and quality in 
crowdsourcing environments (Satzger et al. 2013). Tasks and the creators may be coupled 
more beneficially by distributing tasks based on previous performance or domain of 
interests, for instance. Second, dividing crowds to pick and deliver order separately can 
be identified from crowdsourced product development. As described in the chapter 2, in 
software product development crowds’ activities may be separated into more manageable 
tasks. TopCoder, for instance, organized contests separately in architecture, software 
design and testing (Boudreau & Hagiu 2008).  
The case companies adopted also strategies that were identified from MSP literature. For 
example, crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms subsidized sides and integrated into a 
side by offering substitutive products and services. These strategies were appeared 
constantly in MSP literature (e.g., Hagiu 2014), as discussed in the Literature Review 
section.  
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The crowdsourcing and MSP strategies, which the case companies adopted, appeared to 
be complementary. For instance, subsidizing a side and controlled coupling process 
complemented each other. Subsidizing a side essentially aims at engaging the users by 
giving the deliverers higher monetary compensation or by lowering prices for the orderer. 
However, also more beneficial coupling process could be considered as subsidizing a 
side, as it provided deliverers with higher profits and orderers with lower prices. The aim 
of this strategy was to make deliveries more cost efficient, for instance, by distributing 
the orders always to the deliverers that were the closest to the orderers. 
Strategic decisions’ antecedents on crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms 
This study sheds light on the characteristics that affect the strategic decision-making on 
crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms. As concluded in the Literature Review section, 
empirical research on the topic is limited. Therefore, this study yields important 
managerial implications, as it clarifies the antecedents of strategic decisions in the case 
companies.  
These antecedents include the volumes that the nature of the products possible entails and 
the importance of proximity in physical deliveries. Firstly, crowdsourcing goods delivery 
platforms need to take the nature of the commodities they offer to be delivered into 
account. If a platform offers deliveries for goods that are consumed on a daily basis, they 
need to support communication accordingly. Grocery and food delivery platforms, 
OrangeGrocer, GreenGrocer, YellowGrocer and MaroonFood, provided lists of products 
and restricted open communication to minimum to make interactions more efficient. On 
the contrary, on crowdshipping platforms, BlueShipper, PurpleShipper, 
BurgundyDeliverer and IndigoDeliverer, where the services are needed less frequently, 
only open communication was supported. Further, the latter group of case companies 
imposed also an open pricing system where users determined the prices themselves. Thus, 
they relieved themselves from regulating interactions and allowed users to sort out the 
delivery times, prices and possible issues. 
Secondly, the findings emphasize the importance of growth through restricted access. 
Prior literature recognizes the need to limit growth to achieve higher quality (Evans 2003; 
Boudreau & Hagiu 2008) but this study revealed the motives for restricting growth on the 
crowdsourcing goods delivery platforms, in particular. In goods deliveries, the likelihood 
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of relevant connections increases when the service is offered in the limited area due to the 
proximity of deliverers and orderers. Therefore, limited geographical access helped 
crowdsourcing goods delivery companies in building a viable platform. Surprisingly, this 
holds true for the long-distance deliveries, as well. PurpleShipper had considered 
targeting their service most populous cities in the country, thus tapping into high 
trafficked routes. Restricted access would increase the likelihood of relevant connections 
for crowdshipping companies, too. 
5.3. Evaluation of the study and limitations  
This thesis is, by nature, an abductive study where findings are derived inductively from 
the data. Thus, findings drawn from qualitative data are always prone to biases caused by 
subjective interpretation of the author. In addition, the author has to limit the number of 
interviews, narrow down the literature chosen for the thesis and decide when sufficient 
saturation is reached. Although the sample size was rather limited, the themes that 
surfaced in the interviews started eventually to follow the same patterns that had emerged 
from previous interviews. Moreover, a case study based on nine companies is sufficient to 
reach reliable enough conclusions in the limits of a master’s thesis. 
However, the sample was limited in other ways. The sample mainly consisted of 
companies that were slightly more than one year old. Some of the case companies were 
still defining their platform design and experimenting with different models. The case 
companies probably had not had enough experience to create the best practices and refine 
their business models. However, this appears to be the case with the whole industry 
characterized by countless amount of new entrants leveraging the latest technologies.  
Possible biases caused by the young age of the case companies were constrained by 
adding more established players that were more than five years old or received a 
significant amount of funding. 
The findings are also susceptible to biases caused by different circumstances that 
companies were exposed to. Even though the players operated in the domain of 
deliveries, the sample might suffer from too low coherency: almost all the companies 
were situated in different countries where market conditions and people’s behaviour, in 
particular, vary. Thus, in the geologically scattered sample, the case companies might be 
affected by divergent factors that are not related to the study.  
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In the Findings, the case companies’ performance and strategic decisions are reflected 
through their scale. However, neither the scale nor the performance is quantified. Many 
companies were reluctant sharing the data related to their performance and companies 
were received varying amounts of funding which naturally facilitates some to scale up 
and perform better. Instead, the interpretations solely relied on comments of the 
interviewees and the author constructed descriptive sequential contexts, such as launch, 
time before partnerships, first partnerships, which reflected the company scale and 
performance. However, before being able to quantify the metrics conducting a qualitative 
exploratory research was necessary. The highly descriptive verbal illustrations on the 
performance gave understanding on the subject and on the metrics that really yield value 
for crowdsourcing platforms in multi-sided markets.  
5.4. Future research 
As the study was focused in the domain of deliveries that, naturally, sets restrictions on 
the possible platform design, future research could extend these findings to other 
industries. Sharing economy has its applications in nearly every industry and many of 
them are only lately emerged and have their own implications on a possible design 
representing interesting research subjects. Similarly, comparing traditional strategies to 
the ones used in various sharing economy applications and how the context affects the 
strategic choices represent interesting research topics. 
As the industry evolves, the future research could examine the outcomes of different 
practices typical of crowdsourced platforms. Quantifying and comparing the key 
performance indicators of surviving players would reach more accurate results on the best 
practices that entail success. This would clarify also the consequences of different 
crowdsourcing and MSP strategies.  
This study explored the use of price and non-pecuniary mechanisms in a high level in the 
context of multi-sided crowdsourcing platforms in the domain of delivery. The use of the 
two mechanisms is highly dependent on the context. The future research could study 
more precisely the right balance of price and non-pecuniary mechanisms to engage 
crowds and how different context affect them. This study explored the use of the two in 
the context of crowdsourcing in multi-sided markets in the service domain but neglected 
more precise evaluation of their balance.   
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APPENDIX 
The guiding interview questions 
• What does the company do? 
• Who are the different user groups in your service?  
o Does the company have partnerships with retailers? 
• How do each benefit from using the service? 
o What are the benefits for retailers?  
• What are the main benefits in crowdsourcing grocery deliveries? 
o How have you exploited these? 
• What are the main issues and obstacles in crowdsourcing grocery deliveries?  
o How have you solved these? 
o How the chicken-and-egg/critical mass/initial mass problem should be 
solved?  
• What are the other these kind of possible effects in crowdsourcing services that 
would either further encourage or hinder the use of your service?  
o How have you exploited/solved these? 
• What are the most important (aspects, processes, features, processes, resources or 
activities) for making your service (and other services alike) viable and eventually 
turn to profit?  
o Why?  
• How are the prices determined for each user group?  
o Why? 
• Where does your revenue come from? 
• How would you describe the company’s cost structure? 
• How do you pay/reward your drivers/shoppers/deliverers/crowds?  
• Can any one become a deliverer?  
o How do you control it? 
• What are the possible quality issues  
o How do you ensure it in your service?  
• What other control do you have over the crowds or interactions between the 
different user groups? 
• What makes your service convenient, beneficial, inspiring, or/and motivational for 
each user group?  
o How do you further encourage the use of your service for each side 
(features)? 
• How are you going to scale? What will be changed? 
 
 
